It was about this time last week that Pablo Sandoval signed with the Red Sox and shocked baseball. The surprise stemmed partially from the fit—Hanley Ramirez had reportedly agreed to terms with the Red Sox hours earlier, meaning Sandoval's addition complicated an already complex infield situation. But this piece isn't about the Red Sox or how they intend to cram so many talented players into one lineup. Rather, this piece is about the most jarring aspect of the deal: Sandoval leaving San Francisco.
Over the past decade, Brian Sabean has snuffed out many of the go-to jokes about him. Some of them were extinguished by legitimate behavioral shifts—the Giants have fielded a roster with an average batter age exceeding 30 just once since Barry Bonds departed, and haven't forfeited a first-round pick since 2005—and some of them went away simply because his teams have won three of the past five World Series. Yet Sabean has gifted us with a new meme-slash-belief about him during these title runs—that he's impossibly loyal to members of those championship squads in the immediate aftermath.
Reconciling that perception with Sandoval's decision doesn't create a crisis of faith, but it does allow us a chance to reevaluate the facts behind Sabean's supposed post-championship loyalty. Does champagne leave Sabean in a re-signing mood, or is he always that way? Alternatively, is Sabean any more loyal than other recent title-winning execs?
To answer those questions, we investigated each Sabean and World Series-winning roster since 2004. A few playing-time thresholds were put in place in order to maintain a level of player decency (i.e. not backup catchers and up-and-down relievers): A pitcher had to complete at least 35 innings to qualify, while a hitter had to notch 200 or more plate appearances; those thresholds resulted in 15 or more players per team (or 60 percent of the 25-man roster). From there, those players' status for the subsequent season were considered. If the player returned to the organization, even if only to depart during spring training or to play in the minors, then he was classified as retained. If the player retired, was traded elsewhere during the winter, or signed elsewhere, then he was considered a departure.
Simple enough, right? Good. Here's how Sabean compares to himself:
Year |
Wins |
Qual. P |
Qual. H |
Total Returned |
Return% |
Notable Exits |
2013 |
76 |
14 |
10 |
21 |
88% |
|
2012 |
94 |
11 |
12 |
20 |
87% |
|
2011 |
86 |
13 |
14 |
22 |
81% |
|
2010 |
92 |
11 |
11 |
18 |
82% |
|
2009 |
88 |
12 |
11 |
16 |
70% |
|
2008 |
72 |
13 |
11 |
16 |
67% |
|
2007 |
71 |
14 |
10 |
15 |
63% |
Barry Bonds, Jason Schmidt, Pedro Feliz |
2006 |
76 |
11 |
11 |
16 |
73% |
|
2005 |
75 |
13 |
12 |
17 |
68% |
|
2004 |
91 |
13 |
11 |
20 |
83% |
There's an obvious (and expected) relationship to establish here: the better the team, the higher the retention rate. There were two noteworthy exceptions: A disappointing 2013 and a surprising 2009, which saw the Giants win a lot of games and finish third in the division; Sabean later retooled the roster with internal promotions and nifty veteran additions. On the whole, though, no illogical acts of loyalty.
Now for how Sabean stacks up to the other World Series winners:
Year |
Team |
Qual. P |
Qual. H |
Total Returned |
Return% |
Notable Exits |
2007 |
Red Sox |
13 |
11 |
22 |
92% |
|
2012 |
Giants |
11 |
12 |
20 |
87% |
Melky Cabrera |
2010 |
Giants |
11 |
11 |
18 |
82% |
Juan Uribe, Edgar Renteria |
2008 |
Phillies |
12 |
12 |
19 |
79% |
Pat Burrell, Geoff Jenkins, Pedro Feliz |
2004 |
Red Sox |
8 |
11 |
15 |
79% |
|
2006 |
Cardinals |
14 |
13 |
21 |
78% |
|
2005 |
White Sox |
12 |
10 |
17 |
77% |
|
2011 |
Cardinals |
9 |
12 |
16 |
76% |
|
2013 |
Red Sox |
11 |
12 |
17 |
74% |
|
2009 |
Yankees |
13 |
10 |
17 |
74% |
Johnny Damon, Hideki Matsui, Melky Cabrera |
Sure enough, Sabean has returned the second- and third-highest rate of players following a championship, thereby validating our beliefs about his post-parade antics. Except there is a catch.
When you think about it, the surest way for a team to retain a high percentage of its players following a championship has less to do with its budget or desires and more to do with the complexion of the team. (And to be clear, this isn't or shouldn't be the goal, it's just a nice perk.) Teams with younger cores, not in age but in experience, are more likely to stick together for another season than those with older cores because the risk of free agency or retirement isn't as high. The Giants' recent championship squads, particularly the '12 and '14 editions, had this going for them with their lineups and pitching staffs. Sabean still re-signed a few veterans, like Aubrey Huff and Pat Burrell, which boosted his percentages, but his high retention rates were mostly organic.
What's more interesting (and pertinent to the topic at hand) is who Sabean let walk, as it's seldom a productive player in his prime. Sabean passed on Melky Cabrera for reasons other than his play, and might've been turned off by A.J. Pierzynski's attitude or uncharacteristic season. Many of the other notable departures were due to talent or age concerns. Uribe, for instance, was already on the wrong side of 30 when he sidled over to the Dodgers. Schmidt and Bonds were also older, and would combine to appear in just 10 big-league games after they left (although, to be fair, that number is almost certainly deflated due to something like collusion against Bonds). Sabean tends to keep good players around—especially if he's younger.
Because of that track record, nothing seemed like a surer bet than Sabean re-signing a prime-age star coming off a World Series parade. And wouldn't you know it, that expectation had merit. Sabean tried keeping Sandoval by offering him a similar contract to the one he signed in Boston, and by showing a willingness to stretch financially to secure his services. Yet Sandoval still hopped on a cross-country flight with a pen in his hand and smile on his face. As we've seen time and again, loyalty only goes so far in this game—even when it involves Sabean.
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