You’d think that Yankees fans, who are used to seeing their team sign other cities’ superstars, would be upset about losing a homegrown second baseman who’s coming off four straight five-win seasons. But based on a winter’s worth of conversation—and as a New Yorker who writes about baseball, I’ve had a lot of conversations about Cano—most of them don’t sound too broken up about it. Partly that’s because spending hundreds of millions on other free agents eases the sting. Partly it’s because the Mariners gave Cano so many years and so much money. But another part of the reason—and I really believe this—is that Cano was known for not really running to first. If Cano couldn’t be bothered to bleed for every base hit while he was here, Yankees fans seem to say, then why would we miss him?
That familiar refrain resurfaced on Monday, when the Daily News’ John Harper published a piece on Cano with some critical quotes from Yankees hitting coach Kevin Long. To be fair, Long’s comments were partially based on being mindful of public perception—since Cano’s reluctance to run harder bothered the fans, Long suggests, he would’ve been wise to appease them. But Long also makes clear that he couldn’t condone Cano’s lollygagging or swallow his explanations of why he wanted to run at less than maximum speed:
The reasons aren’t going to make sense. He might say his legs didn’t feel good, or he was playing every day and needed to save his energy. To me there was no acceptable answer.
So how much did Cano’s famously slow times to first cost the Yankees? And is Long right, or was Cano’s strategy sound?
It’s easy to compare Cano’s infield hit percentage (infield hits divided by ground balls) to the league’s. But we can get more granular and more accurate by accounting for his handedness (since lefties, all else being equal, get out of the box and down to first faster) and ground ball distribution (it’s easier to beat out grounders to third and shortstop than grounders to second and first, and each hitter has a different infield spray chart.) “If we can get more granular AND more accurate,†I always say, “then we’d damn well better do it.†So let’s.
Before we do, we have to make two assumptions: first, that Cano is an average runner, and second, that there’s nothing else about him that makes his grounders unusually easy or difficult to field.
The first assumption seems safe enough. Grading Cano’s run tool requires some imagination; this is, after all, an article about how he refuses to sprint. The fastest times I got on double-play grounders to the left side were in the 4.3 range, which would make him a 40 runner. But even on his best times, Cano looked like he had a little left in him. I don’t think it’s a stretch to that he could post a 50 run time if someone told him that the fate of the Robinson Cano Pediatric Physical and Occupational Therapy Suite at the Hackensack University Medical Center hinged on his time to first (a tactic Long never tried).
The second assumption is iffier. For one thing, Cano surely hits harder-than-average grounders, giving opposing infielders more time to make sure their throws beat him to the bag. That could hurt his infield hit rate, but we can’t calculate what it would have been otherwise. Just keep in mind that the stats you’re about to see might exaggerate the real situation slightly.
Okay, caveats out of the way. The following table compares Cano’s outcomes on groundballs from 2005-13 to the average left-handed-hitting non-pitcher’s. “Count†is the number of infield grounders that were touched by the fielder specified in the second column; “GB Out†is the ones on which outs were recorded; “INF 1B†and “ROE†are infield singles and reached on errors, respectively. The next two columns show the rate at which a grounder to a given position resulted in an infield single or an infield single/reach on error. The final two columns show how much less often Cano reached on grounders to each infielder than the typical lefty non-pitcher, and how many hits he “lost†if we multiply the difference in rate by the number of applicable batted balls.
Batter |
Fielder |
Count |
GB Out |
INF 1B |
ROE |
INF 1B% |
INF 1B+ROE% |
Net Hits |
|
All LHH |
1 |
21435 |
18681 |
2164 |
590 |
10.1 |
12.9 |
 |
 |
All LHH |
2 |
2375 |
1882 |
439 |
54 |
18.5 |
20.8 |
 |
 |
All LHH |
3 |
47267 |
44096 |
1828 |
1343 |
3.9 |
6.7 |
 |
 |
All LHH |
4 |
70366 |
65014 |
4010 |
1342 |
5.7 |
7.6 |
 |
 |
All LHH |
5 |
14804 |
11543 |
2640 |
621 |
17.8 |
22.0 |
 |
 |
All LHH |
6 |
32020 |
27325 |
3654 |
1041 |
11.4 |
14.7 |
 |
 |
Total |
 |
188267 |
168541 |
14735 |
4991 |
7.8 |
10.5 |
 |
 |
Cano |
1 |
193 |
173 |
13 |
7 |
6.7 |
10.4 |
-2.5 |
-5 |
Cano |
2 |
16 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
-20.8 |
-3 |
Cano |
3 |
399 |
381 |
14 |
4 |
3.5 |
4.5 |
-2.2 |
-9 |
Cano |
4 |
732 |
676 |
37 |
19 |
5.1 |
7.7 |
0.0 |
0 |
Cano |
5 |
143 |
119 |
15 |
9 |
10.5 |
16.8 |
-5.3 |
-8 |
Cano |
6 |
323 |
287 |
26 |
10 |
8.1 |
11.2 |
-3.5 |
-11 |
Total |
 |
1806 |
1652 |
105 |
49 |
5.8 |
8.5 |
-2.0 |
-35 |
That’s a big box o’ numbers, but you can safely ignore the ones that aren’t bolded in the bottom right. Those tell us that Cano reached on five fewer grounders back to the mound than the average lefty-swinging non-pitcher would have in the same number of opportunities; three fewer grounders to the catcher; nine fewer grounders to first; no fewer grounders to second; eight fewer to third base, and 11 fewer grounders to shortstop, for a total of 35 fewer on-base events.
Thirty-five lost trips to first sounds like a lot, and it’s not insignificant. The run value of an infield single by a lefty batter is around .4 runs, and an out is -0.3, so changing 35 outs into infield singles adds up to about 25 runs. On the surface, at least, Cano cost the Yankees two and a half wins (over nine seasons) by not making an average effort to beat out groundballs.
Hold that thought. While we’re at it, let’s run the same stats for Derek Jeter, whose hustle sets the standard to which Cano’s is often unfavorably compared. This time the table pits Jeter against all right-handed non-pitcher batters from 1995-2013.
Batter |
Fielder |
Count |
GB Out |
INF 1B |
ROE |
INF 1B% |
INF 1B+ROE% |
DIFF |
Net Hits |
All RHH |
1 |
54445 |
48689 |
4199 |
1557 |
7.7 |
10.6 |
 |
 |
All RHH |
2 |
4938 |
4266 |
530 |
142 |
10.7 |
13.6 |
 |
 |
All RHH |
3 |
26605 |
23967 |
1694 |
944 |
6.4 |
9.9 |
 |
 |
All RHH |
4 |
84669 |
77128 |
5565 |
1976 |
6.6 |
8.9 |
 |
 |
All RHH |
5 |
162697 |
141613 |
13074 |
8010 |
8.0 |
13.0 |
 |
 |
All RHH |
6 |
185048 |
164935 |
13746 |
6367 |
7.4 |
10.9 |
 |
 |
Total |
 |
518402 |
460598 |
38808 |
18996 |
7.5 |
11.2 |
 |
 |
Jeter |
1 |
504 |
437 |
49 |
18 |
9.7 |
13.3 |
2.7 |
14 |
Jeter |
2 |
33 |
26 |
7 |
0 |
21.2 |
21.2 |
7.6 |
3 |
Jeter |
3 |
224 |
194 |
20 |
10 |
8.9 |
13.4 |
3.5 |
8 |
Jeter |
4 |
864 |
788 |
53 |
23 |
6.1 |
8.8 |
-0.1 |
-1 |
Jeter |
5 |
1064 |
861 |
137 |
66 |
12.9 |
19.1 |
6.1 |
65 |
Jeter |
6 |
1477 |
1304 |
120 |
53 |
8.1 |
11.7 |
0.8 |
12 |
Total |
 |
4166 |
3610 |
386 |
170 |
9.3 |
13.4 |
2.2 |
101 |
Hustle aside, Jeter was faster than Cano in their respective primes, so it’s not fair to pretend that they were working with the same wheels. Jeter also hit grounders at a much higher rate, which made it more vital for him to turn some of them into singles. Still, we have to hand it to the popular perception. Sometimes, fans form opinions about a player’s effort level based on potentially misleading personal traits like low affect or how hard it looks like he’s running. In this case, though, the data backs up the widespread belief. Cano’s expected infield reach rate comes out 2.0 percentage points behind his peers, while Jeter rates 2.2 percentage points ahead of his.
What the data doesn’t support, though, is the popular perception of how much this matters. The stats suggest that Cano has cost himself a trip to first every 39 games, or about four times per season. Jeter has given himself a hustle single once every 26 games, or about 6.3 times per season. Either way, we’re talking about three or four runs a year, a relatively modest total for two players who’ve repeatedly topped 30 runs above average on offense.
Of course, the fuss about running to first is driven more by emotion than by concern about missing singles. Fans want to feel that the players they root for are as invested in the team’s success as they are, a belief that’s seriously tested by the sight of someone jogging when the spectator’s instinct is to scream for him to run. And they definitely don’t want to see any slack from athletes who are making many millions of dollars, even if those dollars don’t come out of their wallet.
Still, it’s important to know what the numbers say; once we do, we can use that knowledge to keep our emotions in check. Long claimed that Cano’s justifications for not running out routine grounders weren’t valid, but in light of what the stats say, Cano’s reasons for not running hard on every grounder appear perfectly rational. Seattle’s new second baseman averaged 5.9 wins over the past three seasons; let’s call that 59 runs. At that level of production, Cano contributed a run, on average, every 2.75 games, and produced 2.8 runs—roughly the value of those four missing hustle singles—every seven or eight games. If busting it down the line had led to a muscle strain that cost Cano a week, any value added would’ve been wiped out. If it caused a more serious injury that required a trip to the DL, it would’ve been a net negative. That’s not even accounting for the effects of fatigue on Cano’s production, or the fact that he likely adjusts his running speed depending on the situation, slowing down more in low-leverage spots. And again, that’s assuming that he’s capable of a 4.20 time to first, and that hitting his grounders harder doesn’t make it much more difficult for him to beat balls out.
We don’t know how much running all out increases a player’s injury risk, but if the difference is significant, it makes sense to take it easy. Cano’s lone DL stint came when he strained his hamstring while attempting to leg out a double in 2006. Maybe he took that as a warning. If so, it’s worked out well: He’s played in at least 159 games for seven straight years. (Jeter, of course, has been durable too, though he did strain a calf by running hard to first last season, even after Joe Girardi asked him nicely not to.)
If all we know about a player is that he doesn’t sprint to first, it might be fair to wonder about his work ethic. But Long, who’s worked with Cano closely, praises his effort in other areas. So, memo to Mariners fans. When you see your new superstar plodding down the line, remember what’s at stake: only four singles a season—four singles that could come with a cost in playing time. Then ask yourself this: Would you rather have slow Cano now or risk a lot of Bloomquist later?
Thanks to Rob McQuown for research assistance.
Thank you for reading
This is a free article. If you enjoyed it, consider subscribing to Baseball Prospectus. Subscriptions support ongoing public baseball research and analysis in an increasingly proprietary environment.
Subscribe now
Does it make sense to take it easy? Working from your own examples, one Derek Jeter has been busting his tail down the line for 19 seasons now. Take out 2013's 17-game debacle and 1995's 15-game cup of coffee, and you have a player who has played in 2570 games over 17 seasons, an average of 151+ games per season, all while allegedly playing full bore all the time.
In the same-age nine-year period (age 22-30), Cano played in 1374 games and Jeter played in 1351. That means Cano played in 2.5 more games per season than Jeter, maybe because Cano dogged it at times. But when you look at their plate appearances over the same time period, Jeter had 6193 and Cano had 5791. So "taking it easy" may have possibly saved Cano some injury time -- we don't know that, of course -- but Jeter somehow managed to "hustle" through an extra 402 PAs.
What is the cost of "taking it easy"? I love that you were able to quantify it on the field to some extent. But what about the PR cost? I'm a Red Sox fan and even I like to watch Jeter.
It would be hard to extrapolate the reasons a Yankees fan might choose to buy a Jeter jersey over a Cano jersey, but I am guessing that the public perception that one guy seems to hustle and the other guy doesn't would have some impact.
The PR perception issue was notable this offseason, when Yankee fans watched Cano head to Seattle with a collective "Oh well." Meanwhile, people will be weeping into their over-priced beer cups when Jeter plays his last game…at Fenway even!
Cano's career AVG: .309
Cano's career AVG, adding back 49 singles from lollygagging: .318
Jeter's career AVG: .312
Jeter's career AVG, removing 104 hustle singles: .303, calm eyes
The injury link is very hard to quantify, since you can take Jeter's durability (or Ichiro's, etc.) as disproof as much as you can take Cano's durability as proof. You can't take either as evidence of anything without much more work. Crudely, you could compare home-to-first times vs. (leg) injury frequency for many players (sorted by speed?), but survivor's bias might get gory and leg injuries are going to be small sample size events.
On the other hand, Davis is much loved (Bonds not so much) and has a World Series ring for his efforts. I'd argue that Davis's hustle and the leadership it showed vs. Bonds' lack thereof is the difference between one having a ring and the other not. There are alot of different things to balance on this scale.
Unless, of course, you are prepared to prove that the Giants bullpen melted down against the Angels in game six because the relievers were all miffed that Bonds didn't hustle enough over the years.
I'd also argue that the only reason why Shinjo (their best defensive outfielder) was DHing was because Bonds (their worst) wanted to be in the field. So Bonds cost his team with his ego in adddition to his lack of effort.
So despite sharing quite a bit of DNA Cal didn't hit the DL until his late 30s, and Bill was seemingly injured every six weeks.
My problem is: Where does this self-protection end?
Will he not run hard on a ball possibly in the gap and be content with a single?
Will he not back up 1st on bunts down the line fielded by the catcher?
Why hang in on tough DP chances instead of bailing out?
(Insert your own preventing/adding bases here)
Do you want ALL the players on your team pulling this crap?
Is that a team you could enjoy rooting for?
(Possibly relevant: Cano's baserunning numbers are average to slightly below)
I think the real argument against this behavior, as alluded to by others, is that lolly-gagging a lot might make a player less able to take advantage in the handful of cases where they do matter, and/or more likely to get hurt while doing so. That's a hard thing to test though.
You can't lollygag with the game on the line, can you? And aren't some games decided by a fourth inning "hustle play"?
Also, why wouldn't you actually spend the offseason getting your body in shape so you CAN run hard to first base, even on the routine ground balls?
I agree with elljay: Everyone hustles, or everyone doesn't hustle. Why would one player get special handling (unless he is nursing an injury, which is legit)?
The argument that 35 hits over nine seasons is a small price to pay for good health is outweighed by the fact that Cano looks like he is dogging it, IMO. I know this places me in the "You kids get off my lawn" category, but I can't help that.
If advanced sabremetrics lead to managers telling their best players to dog it down the line, then I am going to have to join the legion of "old school" folks who can't accept the "stat heads"!
What percentage of infield errors on plays at 1B come with noted speedsters running? How different is it, rate-wise, between speedsters, those with average speed and slow-pokes?
Speaking of which, where does Paul Newman come out in all this?
Not really any bearing on the article, just an interesting observation I heard. Nice work.