There’s one particular baseball play that I don’t get: First and third (or
bases loaded) and two outs, ground ball hit to a middle infielder who throws
to his double-play partner for a force at second base. Most of the time,
you’ll see the runner slide into the bag, and the times he doesn’t, it’s
because he’s nowhere near it when the play is made.
Why?
Sliding has two purposes: avoiding a tag and decelerating into a base you
can’t legally overrun. While the above fits the latter category, it’s a
situation where the cost of deceleration is greater than the penalty for
overunning the bag. If a runner instead chose to sprint through second base
and keep heading for third, he might be safe–I don’t know, let’s say one time
in 20, but I think it would be more than that–but every time he was
safe, a run would score, with the runner likely being out in a tag play on
his way to third base.
I suppose you could argue that the runner slides in case the middle infielders
botch the play, but I don’t buy that, because an error gets made there about
as often as I eat tofu. It seems to me that teams are “giving up”
here, where a more aggressive approach–running through the bag and making the
turn–could steal a few runs a season. This wouldn’t apply all the time; some
plays are going to be close enough to warrant a slide, and on others the
runner isn’t close enough to bother. But on maybe 40% to 50% of these plays, a
meek slide into second base reduces the chance that the run will score for no
reason other than politeness.
Is there something I’m missing, a rule dating from the days of John McGraw’s
Orioles that disallows this practice? Or is it something from the Big Bob
Book of Unwritten Rules, with its pages and pages of crayon drawings?
Last week, I wrote about what baseball can do to improve the selection of owners. This week, I want to focus on the game’s structure. Frankly it’s a column that, if I thought I could get away with it, would consist of six words: Stop trying to be the NFL.
Since 1994, when the game went to three divisions in each league and began allowing non-division winners into the playoffs, MLB has moved inexorably toward becoming Just Another Sports League. While the game’s administrators like to defend the changes by invoking the need to appeal to young people and a broad audience of sports fans, the fact is that every single move has been reactionary, every one has eliminated a point of differentiation between MLB and the other three major sports, and none of them have shown any level of insight beyond: “How can we get more TV money right now?”
Last night, the White Sox lost their 10th game in 14 tries, dropping a rain-shortened 5-1 decision to the Mariners. In addition to lowering their record to 15-16, by scoring just one run their runs-per-game fell to a meager 4.2, placing them 12th in the American League (and 10th in Equivalent Average).
Why do the White Sox suck at the plate? This team was third in the league in runs scored last year, and they return essentially the same cast of characters. I expected them to have one of the better offenses in the league, thanks in part to a full season of Joe Crede at third base, and the arrival of Miguel Olivo behind the plate. Those two players, in fact, have been part of the problem; Crede is hitting .235/.259/.353 and Olivo, splitting the catching duties down the middle with Sandy Alomar Jr., is at .222/.236/.389. Mix in the failure of Aaron Rowand to be an adequate stopgap in center field (.133/.300/.167 in 60 at-bats before his demotion), and you can see that the White Sox infusion of youth has failed badly.
I’ve said it before and I’ll say it again: reader feedback is one of the great parts of this job. I’m lucky–everyone at BP is lucky–to write for an audience that provides thoughtful, articulate responses. It keeps reading e-mail from being a cringeworthy job, and turns it into an informative experience.
I read every piece of mail I get, from two-liners to two chapters. That I don’t respond to it all is a flaw in my game, like my inability to handle a good fastball or make the throw from the hole. I’ll keep working on it.
For today, here’s a sample of the feedback, and a promise to spend an afternoon next week going through my “Reader Mail” folder and getting back to you.
With Ramiro Mendoza and Brandon Lyon combining to allow two runs
Wednesday, the Red Sox bullpen has now given up 16 runs in 23 9th innings.
They’ve used seven different pitchers to protect 9th-inning leads (plus
Jason Shiell to hold a 14th-inning bulge), and the question of who will
pitch the ninth is a question that every member of Red Sox Nation has been
obsessing about since long before Opening Day.
Much of this stems from a misunderstanding of the “no-closer”
bullpen that the Red Sox assembled this winter. While the strategy downplays
the save statistic, it’s not about random roles for pitchers, which is how
many people have interpreted it. Roughly speaking, the idea is that the
bullpen’s best pitcher will throw the highest-leverage innings, rather than
being used solely in save situations. This is done in part by trading off
low-leverage save situations—-three-run leads in the ninth inning that can be
protected by lesser pitchers—-for higher-leverage situations earlier in the
game.
There are other principles in play as well, such as minimizing the use of
one-batter specialists, and allowing effective relievers to pitch multiple
innings, but the basic idea is to allow game situations, not Jerome Holtzman’s
legacy, to dictate how the bullpen’s best pitcher is used.
One of the baseball stories I managed to catch while on my vacation was Bud
Selig’s
announcement that he would not pursue a new contract after his current
one
expires. This means that his tenure as commissioner–one that began with
him
taking the job on an interim basis a decade ago–would end in December
2006.
It’s no secret that I’ve disagreed with how Selig has run the game, in
particular his anti-marketing strategies in pursuit of a favorable
labor
agreement. The short-term gain of a Collective Bargaining Agreement
that
benefited management wasn’t worth the years of damage Selig and his
cohort
did with their relentless bashing of what was a healthy industry.
Declines in
attendance, TV ratings and revenue, as well as fiascoes like contraction
and
the Expos situation, can largely be traced to Selig’s efforts to
convince
people that baseball wasn’t viable, wasn’t competitive, and wasn’t
worth their
time.
With a new CBA in place, though, and Selig setting his own exit date,
it’s
time to look forward and see what can be done between now and the end
of 2006.
What positive steps can and should be taken to ensure that Selig leaves
the
game in better shape than it’s in right now? Every now and then this
year, I’m
going to pick an aspect of the game and lay out what I think should be
done to
improve it. While I’ll isolate one level of the game in each column,
the ideas
I’m presenting need to be viewed as a whole, as one big plan to get
baseball
where it needs to be.
I’ll start with the game’s ownership, because I think everything grows
from
that. Over the past decade, baseball has brought in a number of owners,
both
individual and corporate, that have had a net negative effect on the
game.
From grandstanding over taxpayer-funded ballparks and inflated claims
of
losses, to taking short-term approaches in a long-term industry, the
most
recent set of “lords of the realm” have been a disaster.
Sometimes, the game loves you back.
I spent last week on the road, first on a trip with my wife, Sophia, then off to see an old friend from the East Coast who was out on this one. I didn’t see much baseball from the 19th through the 26th, even missing the highlight shows most of the time. It was a good break; I remarked to Sophia on Tuesday, as a game aired on a television in the back of a restaurant, that I was really starting to miss the game. While I was enjoying our trip, I was also looking forward to getting back to “normal” life a little, immersing myself in the game and writing again.
With my travel complete, yesterday was the first time in a while I’d had a chance to follow a day of baseball the way I usually do, watching games on television and following the untelevised ones online. I picked a pretty good day to return, because almost as if the game missed me and wanted to show me just how much, baseball provided a ridiculously entertaining day of highs and lows.
Joe Sheehan looks back at Morris to see if he really could pitch to the score.
I was messing around with ESPN.com’s sortable stats late Thursday night, when I began to realize something. We’re on the cusp of when the performances we’re seeing start to have some meaning; guys are making their fourth starts, hitters are edging towards 100 plate appearances. For a performance analyst, it’s a fun time to take a global look at the numbers.
The Phillies are 9-6, tied for first in the NL East. Even after a couple of low-scoring nights against the Marlins, they lead the world in runs scored. I mention that because this is going to seem like a strange time to pick on their offense. Bear with me.
In my NL East preview, I wrote the following:
“It is interesting to look at the Phillies’ lineup and see just how many slots have major platoon issues. Jim Thome and Bobby Abreu routinely lose 150 to 300 points of slugging against lefties, while Polanco and Mike Lieberthal are everyday players in name only; neither hits right-handers well enough to justify his lineup spot or salary. The Phillies might get away with this during the regular season, but it’s hard to envision them winning a short playoff series against a good manager, one willing to exploit these weaknesses.”
Here are the career platoon splits, through Tuesday, for the eight Phillies starters and their current center fielder. They’re listed in the most common order in which they’ve appeared.
You know what the world needs? The world needs another article on the lousy work an AL East contender is getting from its relievers. Except, this one isn’t about the Red Sox and their closer-free bullpen. This is about the Yankees and their talent-free bullpen. Let’s compare the two…
One of the completely ridiculous statements leveled at perfromance analysts–or “statheads,” if you prefer–is the idea that they need to get their heads out of a stat book and watch a game once in a while. It’s silly, because the analysts I know not only watch a ton of baseball, they have a love for the game that’s not found in many places. Personally, I watch as much MLB as I can, and most of my column ideas come from watching games, both in person and on television.
I was reading the most recent issue of Sports Illustrated yesterday, which includes an article chastising Tiger Woods for not being more involved in the effort to get Augusta National Golf Club to admit a woman member.
Going over the article, I couldn’t help but think of the controversy surrounding the Hall of Fame’s decision to cancel festivities celebrating the 15th anniversary of the release of “Bull Durham.” Hall president Dale Petroskey called off the event, citing the anti-war views of stars Tim Robbins and Susan Sarandon, and the possibility that the two would turn the ceremonies into a platform for their opinions.
From Mark Prior to Greg Maddux to Rich Harden, Joe Sheehan discusses the
performances of stud starters–present, past and future.
Monday, the Red Sox picked up the option on Pedro Martinez’s contract.
The move, which Martinez had been agitating for since last winter, guarantees
Martinez $17.5 million in 2004.
To understand just how far through the looking glass we are on this issue,
consider the headline on ESPN.com’s baseball page: “Red Sox finally pick
up Pedro’s 2004 option.” Finally. An option with a deadline
of November 5 gets picked up on April 7, and the word used to describe this is
“finally”?
For the second time in five days, Joe Sheehan explores the options available
to a team losing a star to a dislocated shoulder. Plus, the Disar Awards
return!