Judging by the early reaction in the blogopshere, the Red Sox have been painted into something of a corner. There are people that think that Papelbon has more value as a starter, and they’re upset by this decision. Then there are people — people like me — who think he should have remained in the bullpen to begin with. Some of those people are upset by this decision too, because it seems to reflect disorganization on the part of the Red Sox. You might even have checked in expecting me to do a little bit of gloating about all of this.
But I think we should avoid that reaction. Smart people have bad ideas — and the idea to move Papelbon to the rotation without having a succession plan in place for the closer’s job was a bad idea. But really smart people are able to recognize when they’ve have bad ideas. Maybe they don’t see the light at first, but once they’re able to sort through all the available information, they’re humble enough to change their minds.
That’s what happened here. I never really bought the “Papelbon is medically unable to close” line. The Red Sox made a decision based on the expectation that it would be easier to find an ace reliever than a decent starter. Then they looked at their in-house options, looked around the league a little bit — and they changed their minds. Part of the problem, it seems, is that even if the Red Sox buy into the sabermetric orthodoxy that ace relievers are overvalued, most of the rest of the league doesn’t. When they kept getting asked a king’s ransom for Armando Benitez or Brad Lidge or whomever, they said “you know what, if that’s the price, let’s just go with our guy”. In hindsight, it looks stupid, but when you’re running a baseball team, it’s foresight that counts.
ADDENDUM (5:30ish): Another thing worth pointing out is that if the Red Sox went into camp uncertain about whether Papelbon should be a starter or a reliever, they had to treat him as a starter for purposes of his training regimen. It’s much easier to wind a guy down than to wind him back up.