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January 21, 2009 Dustying UpAaron Harang's Extra-Inning Adventure
Quantifying the contributions of a baseball manager is a task even the geekiest of us sometimes struggle to break down. Are there certain decisive standards to which managerial judgments can be compared? How much influence does the front office exert over his strategic choices? In such a role-defined era, which situations would merit the usage of a different reliever to set up the closer? Does the manager define these roles? What types of decisions can a manager actually be credited with, given that most alternatives would act the same? More questions along these lines could be added to the evaluation stew, but one axiom remains the same: the true job of a manager involves putting his players in a position to succeed. A competent manager will never slot Willie Bloomquist in the cleanup spot. Nor will he allow Ivan Rodriguez to patrol center field. And he definitely would not ask his ace pitcher to throw four innings of relief, on very short rest, in a meaningless early season game when at least one alternative could have logged the same frames. Wait, scratch that last one, because that hypothetical actually took place, when Dusty Baker called on Aaron Harang to pitch four innings out of the pen in an 18-inning game against the Padres on May 25. Now, Baker's reputation for handling a starting rotation is already about as sterling as Lindsay Lohan's for showing up on time. Justifiably or not, his reputation is directly related to his handling of Mark Prior and Kerry Wood, and their subsequent struggles. It should come as no surprise that four of his starters last season—Bronson Arroyo, Edinson Volquez, Aaron Harang, and Johnny Cueto—all finished in the senior circuit's top twenty in pitcher abuse points. Due to the commonly expressed opinion that Harang's disappointing season was a direct result of Baker's relief experiment on May 25, analysts tend to break his workload into the following three segments: Pre-relief Outings (covering the beginning of season through to May 22); Post-relief Outings (May 29 through an arbitrarily selected August 16); and Arbitrary 8/16 Marker through to the end of season (August 22 through September 30). Breaking it up in this way seems to indicate that Harang bookended his season with very solid performances, yet struggled mightily in his starts from 5/29-8/16, posting a 9.06 ERA. Period GS IP HR/9 BB/9 K/9 ERA 3/31-5/22 11 74.2 1.2 2.2 7.6 3.50 5/29-8/16 10 51.2 2.8 3.3 7.5 9.06 8/22-9/30 8 54 1.5 2.0 6.3 2.83
There's a problem with this tidy arrangement, however. A slight adjustment needs to be made in order to more accurately reflect what happened to Harang in-season, because he suffered an injury near the flexor mass in his right forearm, shelving the ace from July 9 through August 9. In the segment markers noted above, the middle period of ineffectiveness includes two of his starts that occurred after the time spent on the disabled list. The more relevant divisions would be: Pre-relief Outings (4/4-5/22); Post-relief outings to DL (5/29-7/9); and Post-DL (8/10-9/30). This shift takes two hot-off-the-DL starts that some prefer to cobble together with his earlier mid-period struggles (making the mid-period appear worse and the end-season better), and adds the 16 earned runs given up in 7
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If Dusty Baker is my manager and I have an ounce of VORP, I'm demanding a trade. You've got to wonder if a collective shiver went through the locker room at the advent of Dusty in Cincy.
If you can get on Dusty's good side, he'll never let your inadequacies interefere with your play time. Ask Corey Patterson and Neifi Perez.
Don't forget Jose Macias! Zero-point-four WARP1 in 394 PA over two seasons, with an EqA of about .220.