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"No one ever got fired for buying IBM."

That one sentence, popular in corporate IT shops from about 1960 to
1990, spoke volumes to the problems American business faced during that
period. The importance of information technology was growing rapidly and
the understanding of the obstacles to successful use of IT in increasing
efficiency was at least a generation behind the technology itself.
Computers and computer services were extremely expensive investments,
and failures were far more visible (and common) than successes.

As a result, purchasing agents and upper management became very
risk-averse, and IBM was the inertia purchase, the industry standard product
that everyone had heard of. Sure, the product gave only 5% of the
promised efficiency increase, but hey, we went with the industry
standard! It’s not like we failed with some unproven, heretical partner
with no track record.

Business, overall, has gotten somewhat better over the years at making
this type of investment. But what about baseball? Has it gotten better
at making investments, or, more to the point, at solving problems?

Oakland as the Model

Baseball runs about three, perhaps four decades behind the rest of
industry when it comes to its methods and processes. (Yes, it’s an
assertion, but it’s one I’m fairly comfortable with.) Oakland’s Billy
Beane has been held up by Baseball Prospectus and others as the
shining example of the new breed of general manager, one who uses the
scientific method and modern management techniques to run a club and run
it exceptionally well. Mr. Beane has, with the help of a dedicated team
of professionals, built an organization that understands what it takes
to win and executes a well-crafted and feasible plan on a tight budget.

The A’s success, which has been modest so far, is predicated largely on
the run-creating ability of the patient, powerful hitter. The
organization will not reward minor leaguers with promotion or awards
unless they demonstrate the requisite plate discipline. And walks and
power are cheaper than batting average, at least for now.

Baseball analysts have been crowing for years about the importance of
on-base percentage and the inflated perception of batting average. Their
positions have been demonstrated through literally dozens of studies
about offense. The A’s are early adopters of this knowledge, and are
ahead of the curve in MLB because of it. They’re winning games on a
budget and building a culture in their minor-league system that has been
a big part of their producing the best young talent in the league.

But is this advantage sustainable?

Probably not. The information which directed the A’s behavior has now
been proven by a club to be valuable, and other clubs will follow suit.
Eventually, even clubs like the Cubs will emulate successful behavior,
and will see the on-base-percentage-and-power light. Clubs like the A’s
and the Yankees have crossed the chasm from the lab to the field, and
the rest of MLB will eventually follow. After all, that specific tactic
now has a track record, and therefore, the risk of trying the same
tactic and failing has been greatly reduced. With reduced risk, you can
look forward to other clubs making similar moves in the future.

The Next Step

So how do you develop a sustainable advantage?

Assuming that all clubs are within an order of magnitude in terms of
resources, the answer is the same as it is in other businesses:
continuous innovation. Baseball has thousands of processes, from
scouting early high-school talent to charting pitches during a game. In
this myriad of processes, there are countless opportunities for clubs to
take informed, prudent risks. Over time, as people inside and outside
the game research these processes to death, you’ll see some of the
collective knowledge seep into the management practices of clubs. It
won’t happen quickly or evenly, and it will create all sorts of Chicken
Little screeds (such as the one we’re facing now with increased levels
of offense and home runs), but it will happen, and in the long term,
it’ll be for the better.

One place you might see a change or two is in the management of
pitchers. According to Don Fehr (and his predecessors) two things in
baseball are always true–no one’s making any money, and no one has
enough starting pitching. This begs a pretty obvious question, ignoring
the book that can be written about baseball finances: why does there
have to be enough starting pitching?

Managing a pitching staff right now is a very difficult task. You’ve got
11 or 12 guys on a 25-man club, and usually 2-3 shuttle guys in the
minors–the Joe Slusarskis of the world–who have to cover all your
innings. A few of these guys will be injured and put on the disabled
list. Others will be injured, but only enough to be put out of action
for a few games. Still others will be completely ineffective, or worse
yet, suffer a horrific injury that requires a 12-to-18 month rehab
stint. Add in the unavoidable paradox of burning out your most valuable
resources because of their effectiveness, and you’ve got a nightmare in
terms of allocating your resources.

What could make this incredibly difficult task easier? Well, you could
forsake a couple of the advantages that are now sought through tactical
moves, and instead focus on gaining a long-term strategic edge.
Currently, managers scramble both in games and with roster management to
gain a platoon advantage. How many left-handed relievers have a job
solely because they’re left handed?

Imagine a situation in which the management of a club researches the
usage patterns of its pitchers and builds a staff of guys who perform
notably better on predictable workloads and rest. Instead of warming up
Buddy Groom to get Barry Bonds out two hitters down the
road, you leave Anthony Telford in, because Telford works best
throwing two innings every third day. Sure, you may give up some platoon
advantages, and you may lose some flexibility, but what if you shave .25
off the club ERA for the season, and reduce time lost due to injury by
25%?

The manager of the New Orleans Warbirds may go into the 2028 season with
a pitching plan, and it might look something like this:

Innings Plan, May 5-11
Pitcher Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday
Anderson 1-5 7-8 9
Balasubramaniam 1-3 1-4
Dominguez 6-7 5-6 1-2
Kuo 1-5 3-4
Kyntarras 4-7 4-7
Lopez, R. 6-9 5-7
Lopez, S. Extra 5-9 Extra Extra
Orosco, J. 8-9 Extra 3-4 1-2
Robertson 8 9 8
Richards Extra Extra Extra 8-9
Ryu 9 1-2 3

Will it work? It might, it might not. I don’t know. Neither does anyone
else, really. But can you imagine a manager doing this in today’s
climate? If it failed, the manager would roasted alive in the press and
run out of town on a rail. But if the same manager failed with the same
bunch of pitchers using traditional pitching management methods, that
manager would probably hear things like "not enough talent,"
and would be put in the John McNamara hopper of retread managers
available for hire.

There are a huge number of areas of potential improvement in the
management of baseball clubs. Unfortunately, the price for failure is
dear. There are 535 elected positions in the United States Congress, and
only about 100 positions of decision-making authority in MLB when it
comes to player personnel or management. There’s also no shortage of
people willing to fill them. Which means that the culture of
risk-aversion and orthodoxy will be difficult to change.

Gary Huckabay can be reached at huckabay@baseballprospectus.com.