BP360 is Back! One low price for a: BP subscription, 2022 Annual, 2022 Futures Guide, choice of shirt

The closer role developed over a period of years, evolving out of the 1970s
role of ace reliever, a guy who would pitch 120 innings a year in chunks of up
to three at a time. Herman Franks ratcheted down Bruce
‘s workload for the Cubs in the late 1970s, using him solely to
protect leads late in games, and Tony La Russa went even further by
eliminating multiple-inning outings for Dennis Eckersley in
1988. With Eckersley, a new meme took hold: a team’s best reliever had to be
used to get outs 25 through 27 if those outs coincided with a lead of less than four runs. It was the ultimate triumph of statistics–the convoluted save rule–over logic.

At its core, the closer myth holds that those last three outs are the most
important, and therefore the ones you want your best pitcher throwing. If the
closercentric bullpen is to go the way of pullover jerseys and flying-saucer
ballparks, convincing people within the game that there are other, more
important outs will be a good place to start.

One way to chip at that is to compare the situations in which closers are
being used, as opposed to their teammates. For example, the Tigers have
Ugueth Urbina closing and Jamie Walker
pitching in many of the high-leverage non-save situations. This year, Urbina
has six saves, Walker none. Without even getting into the issue of which
pitcher is actually better, look at how each has been deployed this season.
Walker has inherited 12 baserunners, Urbina just three. Walker has been
brought into games in which the tying or go-ahead run was at bat, on base or
in the on-deck circle seven times; Urbina, eight times. Walker’s first batter
has been in the top four lineup spots 12 times, Urbina’s eight times.

Who has had the tougher go of it? To me, that last statistic is the most
damning indictment of the closercentric bullpen. Teams routinely deploy their
set-up man and closer backwards, basing the usage on the inning and not the
opposing hitters. Too often, the second- or third-best pitcher in the
bullpen–or worse, if you employ Eddie Oropesa–is allowed to
face the meat of the lineup in the eighth inning, saving the closer for the
lesser batters should the inferior pitcher not screw up. Wouldn’t it make more
sense to use the better pitcher for the toughest hitters? Don’t you want
John Smoltz pitching to Jim Thome,
Bobby Abreu and Pat Burrell, with
Kevin Gryboski or someone working on Mike
, David Bell and Chase

That’s what the closercentric bullpen gives us: lesser pitchers being used
against better hitters in higher-leverage situations. Just yesterday, the
Tigers let Esteban Yan pitch to the heart of the Rangers’
lineup up 3-1 in the eighth, then brought Urbina in to face the 6-7-8 hitters
with that same lead in the ninth. The Reds’ used John Riedling with a one-run lead against the heart of the Dodgers’ order
in the eighth, and Danny Graves to get out three non-hitters
in the ninth with a three-run lead. If the save rule did not exist–if it had
never been invented–would anyone think this was rational?

(There’s a side issue here, in that often the “closer” isn’t
actually the best pitcher in the team’s bullpen. While I can debate the
relative merits of, say, Riedling and Graves, Dave Miley isn’t doing so, and
the pitchers aren’t being paid or handled in that way. “Closer”
generally is a proxy for “best reliever” in MLB.)

The closer strategy isn’t actually a strategy at all, but a cover that
provides managers with a way to deflect reponsibility and defer actual
decision-making. It’s a suboptimal deployment of talent that costs teams games
while inflating the salaries of fungible players. There’s no special talent
involved in being a closer; three or four guys every season inherit the job
and rack up a bunch of saves simply by not being terrible. The idea that
getting the last three outs is somehow more difficult than getting the
previous three is a myth perpetuated by, generally speaking, the guys who have
had closer jobs. Any examination of actual usage will show that the work done
by the set-up men is no less difficult, and usually more difficult, than
starting the ninth inning with a lead and getting three random guys out.
Entering in higher-leverage situations, such as tie games, specifically to
face tough hitters with runners on base, has more impact of the outcome of the
game without being nearly as glorified.

So who has a tougher job, Gryboski or Smoltz? Ray King or
Jason Isringhausen? B.J. Ryan or
Jorge Julio?

The development of the closer has reached its natural end, where teams are
doing the exact opposite of what would make the most sense in the absence of
the save rule. For the best possible chance of winning, teams need to ignore
saves and revamp their bullpens to make sure their best pitchers are throwing
the highest-leverage innings. The first teams to move to this structure will
hold a competitive advantage until the rest catch up.

Thank you for reading

This is a free article. If you enjoyed it, consider subscribing to Baseball Prospectus. Subscriptions support ongoing public baseball research and analysis in an increasingly proprietary environment.

Subscribe now
You need to be logged in to comment. Login or Subscribe