Last week, Joe Garagiola Jr. made the latest in a long series of
heavily-criticized trades in which he gave up young players developed by the
Diamondbacks for older talent. While the Byung-Hyun
Hillenbrand deal doesn’t quite fit the pattern of his other swaps, it
does share one important characteristic: it was largely panned by outside
I’m with them. While I can see a scenario in which the Diamondbacks win the
deal, I think that they gave up too much talent for a player who is likely to
be average or maybe a little above. The deal is especially problematic because
the Snakes have third-base prospect Chad
Tracy available, and Tracy is a comparable player to Hillenbrand right
now, and comes with a lower price tag and a higher upside.
What keeps me from emptying both barrels on the deal is Garagiola’s track
record. This isn’t the first time he’s made a trade that left me shaking my
head, and yet, the Diamondbacks have been one of the most successful
franchises in baseball since they entered the league. From 1998-2002:
Team Record Pct. Playoffs Titles Yankees 497-309 .617 5 3 Braves 493-315 .610 5 0 A's 457-352 .565 3 0 Giants 457-353 .564 2 0 Mariners 455-354 .562 2 0 Astros 448-362 .553 3 0 Red Sox 446-363 .551 2 0 Cardinals 443-366 .548 3 0 Indians 441-369 .544 3 0 Diamondbacks 440-370 .543 3 1
Keep in mind that you’re looking at the first five years in Diamondbacks
history. They’ve had by far the best opening run of any expansion team:
Team Record Pct. Playoffs Titles Diamondbacks 440-370 .543 3 1 Rockies 363-384 .486 1 0 Royals 383-418 .478 0 0 Marlins 354-390 .476 1 1 Angels 383-425 .474 0 0 Expos 345-458 .430 0 0 Pilots/Brewers 337-466 .420 0 0 Astros 333-475 .412 0 0 Devil Rays 318-490 .394 0 0 Mariners 290-465 .384 0 0 Senators/Rangers 309-499 .382 0 0 Padres 294-506 .368 0 0 Blue Jays 270-482 .359 0 0 Mets 260-547 .322 0 0
(That’s not entirely a fair comparison; MLB changed the rules for the last
couple of expansions, allowing the new teams access to better players in the
Expansion Draft. Additionally, no new teams prior to 1977 had access to a
thriving free-agent market. That’s why three of the top four teams in the
above list come from the 1990s. Nevertheless, the Snakes have outdone even
recent expansion teams by a considerable amount.)
One of the reasons the Diamondbacks have done so well is the trades that
Garagiola has made, and more specifically, his willingness to sacrifice the
future for short-term gain. For all the criticism I and others have heaped on
that willingness, the fact is, he has given up very little in his deals.
These two deals are a unit, and together were the first sign that the
Diamondbacks were not going to be a typical expansion team. While signing
Williams to a five-year extension would be a regrettable move, trading Alvarez
and Drews wouldn’t be; the former played in 92 games in his career, the latter
none. (Randa was not a young player, but rather a 28-year-old coming off
back-to-back .300 batting averages for the Pirates and Royals.)
The pinnacle of Garagiola’s deal-making, this deal set the stage for three
division titles in four years, as Gonzalez immediately became a .300/.400/.500
hitter upon arriving in Phoenix. Garcia, expected to be a great left-handed
power source, washed out of Detroit and had a good half-season with the
Indians in 2002, his only good year at the major-league level. He’s hit
.248/.284/.474 since the deal.
Weichard wasn’t much of a prospect at the time (the Pirates were eager to
trade Womack to make room for Pat
Meares and Mike
Benjamin in their infield), and never played in the majors. Now 30,
Boyd has a career ERA of 6.16 in 87 2/3 innings.
This is the one that stands out. Of all the young players Garagiola has dealt,
only Batista has gone on to have an extended, successful career. While he’s
never posted impressive OBPs, his power has made him an above-average third
baseman in most seasons. He’s hit .256/.304/.482 for the Blue Jays and Orioles
since the trade while playing average-plus defense.
Coming on the heels of the Batista deal, this trade was also battered from
pillar to post, largely because of the expectations for Penny. While both he
and Vlad Nunez have had stretches of success, neither has approached
projections, and both have spent some time either on the DL or in the minors.
Now 25, Penny has a career ERA of 4.15 in 528 2/3 innings, and is on his way
to his best year ever in 2003 (3.50 ERA in 12 starts). Either he or Felix
Rodriguez (traded in the winter of 1998 for Dante
Powell) is behind Batista as the second-best career dealt away by
Vladimir Nunez spent most of 2002 as the Marlins’ closer, but threw just 9 2/3
innings in 2003 before being sent to the minors. Now 28, he has a career ERA
of 4.62 in 381 2/3 innings.
Abraham Nunez suffered a shoulder injury in 2001 that limited him to DH duty
that season. Injured again this year, he’s hanging on to prospect status by a
thread, and has just 17 major-league at-bats to his credit.
Probably the best example of what Garagiola has done, this trade was directly
responsible for the Diamondbacks’ championship in 2001. Like many of the
players the Snakes have traded, Daal and Padilla have had good stretches, even
good seasons, but haven’t had sustained positive value. Daal has been a decent
innings sponge, with ERAs of 4.69 (after the trade in 2000), 4.46, 3.91 (in
Dodger Stadium) and 4.52 this year with the Orioles. Padilla pitched very well
for the Phillies in 2002 (3.28 ERA in 32 starts, 206 innings), but has just a
4.48 ERA so far this year.
Lee and Figueroa haven’t even had that level of success. Lee is one of the
biggest disappointments in baseball in the last decade, an empty .260 hitter
who plays a nice first base. Figueroa has a career ERA of 4.74 in 197 2/3
Conti was 26 at the time, more a Quadruple-A guy than a prospect. He hit
.257/.315/.383 in 222 at-bats for the 2002 Devil Rays. Bierbrodt’s career took
a bizarre turn last winter when he was shot in a late-night altercation. Still
just 25, he has an ERA of 5.86 since the deal, and 8.13 in 34 1/3 innings this
year. (He’s back in the rotation tonight.)
At the time, this looked like an even worse version of the Plesac deal, with
Garagiola swapping two of his system’s top hitting prospects for a lefty
specialist. Cust has been a disappointment, however, hitting .265/.409/.524 in
the friendly confines of Colorado Springs last year, .169/.299/.246 in 65
at-bats with the Rockies, and .266/.423/.370 with Ottawa this year. His
defense remains awful, limiting what a team can do with him, and it’s fair to
say that his status as a prospect is in danger.
Despite a good year with the bat at Double-A Carolina (.283/.370/.498), the
Rockies had Closser open the 2003 season in the Texas League. He’s still
hitting (.268/.358/.452), but the questions about his defense (no better than
seven runs below average over the past three seasons, per Clay Davenport’s
evaluations) are hindering his progress. Like Ben
Petrick before him, he may find a promising career derailed by his
It’s early, but both players fall into the pattern established by so many
prospects traded away by Garagiola: They never again looked as good as they
did on the day they were dealt.
It’s too early to completely evaluate this deal. As expected, Durazo has been
a significant contributor to the A’s offense, hitting .290/.389/.485. He’s
already nearing his career high in at-bats, having avoided the nagging
injuries that plagued him in Arizona. If Durazo plays as expected and stays
healthy, he will likely end up the best player that Garagiola has ever dealt
away…but there are a half-dozen guys on the list above who you would have
expected to claim that crown.
Counting a host of minor deals not included here, Garagiola has traded 32
prospects, 21 of whom had no career after the deal. Some of the remaining 11
players had good seasons here and there, but the best career of the bunch
belongs to a guy with a .304 OBP since the deal. The second-best? A starter
with a 4.15 ERA or a set-up man–Felix Rodriguez–with two notable seasons. It’s
a tremendous track record that demands respect; whatever those of us on the
outside may have thought about the price Garagiola paid to improve his
ballclub, the fact is that he hasn’t traded away much. He was right more often
than not, and you can’t just hand-wave that away with talk of luck or injuries
or how players were mishandled by subsequent organizations.
A few years back, I attempted to distill the differences between what we do
and what scouts do by categorizing the two as “performance analysis”
and “skills analysis.” I wonder if those same principles can’t be
applied to the evaluation of front-office personnel.
It may be that the skills we so admire in some executives–such as the
understanding of how an offense works, the appreciation of sunk costs, the
application of performance analysis–are paralleled by the attributes scouts
find so enticing in young men who play baseball: speed, strength, and an
impressive physique. And just as players who do not possess those skills can
be excellent players, so too can GMs who eschew, or marginalize, the ideas we
embrace rise to the top of their profession.
Are Billy Beane and Theo Epstein the GM equivalent of “tools”
players, while Brian Sabean, Joe Garagiola Jr. and John Schuerholz are the Billy
McMillons and Warren
Newsons and Roberto Petagines,
the guys who don’t get respect but who put runs and wins on the board? Are the
blind spots scouts and other baseball people have when it comes to players who
don’t look like much but produce mirrored by blind spots analysts have toward
GMs who don’t adhere to stathead credos but, nevertheless, also produce?
Performance matters. Garagiola took an expansion team and won a World Series
in four years, making three playoff appearances in that time. Has money been a
factor? Yes, but as we’ve seen in Baltimore, in Texas and in New York, just
throwing money at a roster is not nearly enough to ensure success. Garagiola’s
performance record as GM–not his skills, but his performance–is better than
all but a few of his peers. Whether I like how he’s gotten the job done or
not, I have to respect that he has gotten it done.
If I don’t, I’m no better than the people who laugh at Jeremy