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May 25, 2005
by Rany Jazayerli
Rany Jazayerli has more on draft history, including a conclusion that may surprise you.
May 19, 2005
by Rany Jazayerli
What pool of players to emphasize at the draft table--college or high-school--is one of the game's ongoing debates. The data indicates that one group has a decisive edge in value.
May 13, 2005
by Rany Jazayerli
In the first of a series, Rany examines 15 years' worth of draft data to establish some basic rules.
March 28, 2005
by Rany Jazayerli
Five players who could follow in the footsteps of 2004's biggest surprises.
March 17, 2005
by Rany Jazayerli
He's more than just underrated; Bobby Abreu is on his way to the Hall of Fame.
February 22, 2005
by Rany Jazayerli
Our annual list finds two highly regarded young hitters battling for the top spot.
August 18, 2004
by Rany Jazayerli
Having embarrassed the meek, the good doctor now celebrates the strong by counting down the best-hitting pitchers in baseball.
August 16, 2004
by Rany Jazayerli
What kind of list has Ben Sheets in between Sterling Hitchcock and Ryan Dempster? Not one you want to be on. The good doctor shines a light into some deep, dark corners of the batter's box.
July 14, 2004
by Rany Jazayerli
Imagine spending a week at your cubicle at work, slaving away at that TPS report, and then as you hand it to your boss, she tells you, "Thanks, but the company just decided that they didn't need the report after all. I was just about to e-mail you the memo."
That's about how I feel right now. Having painstakingly put together an article on Danny Kolb, which centered around Kolb's incredible stretch of surrendering no extra-base hits all season, I was all set to have the article published during the All-Star Break--and then Kolb ran into the unstoppable force that is the PECOTA-powered Wily Mo Pena on Sunday.
(Yes, I'm aware that Jason LaRue homered off Kolb before Pena did. But I've been working as a journalist long enough to know it's considered poor form to let the facts get in the way of a good story.)
So the article is ruined.
But you're going to have to read it anyway, unless you really want to hurt my feelings. I've taken the liberty of making some small changes to the piece, in light of Kolb's Sunday meltdown. Most of the points made in the article still stand, even if the punchline has been spoiled.
June 3, 2004
by Rany Jazayerli
It takes a lot these days to awaken me from my slumber and coerce me into penning a column for BP. Between taking care of a baby daughter at home and starting my own medical practice, the truly important things in life--like baseball analysis--have gotten short shrift of late.
But finally, I have found a topic that arouses my passion. A question so intriguing as to get my heart racing, my blood pumping, my brain thinking. Finally, a puzzle worth being solved, a code worth being cracked.
That question, of course, is: "Does Alex Sanchez have the emptiest batting average in major-league history?"
Consider the evidence. Bolstered by an obscene number of bunt hits, Sanchez was hitting .359 going into Wednesday night's game, which ranked him third in the American League. (By the way, who had the exacta on a Melvin Mora-Ken Harvey-Alex Sanchez top three at this point in the season?) But Sanchez's impressive ability to hit singles is neutered by his inability to do anything else: hit for power (eight extra-base hits), reach base by other means (four walks, no HBPs), or make effective use of his speed (11 steals, 10 caught stealings).
For the season, Sanchez is hitting .359/.371/.431. His batting average may rank third in the league, but his 802 OPS ranks just 43rd--in a tie with Jose Cruz, who's hitting .237.
Put succinctly, Sanchez's batting average is about as empty as Le Stade Olympique. But is it the emptiest ever?
May 3, 2004
by Rany Jazayerli
Very quietly, with almost no fanfare whatsoever, one of the most significant developments of the year just occurred in Denver. As reported in Denver Post, the Rockies are switching to a four-man rotation.
Let me repeat that: the COLORADO ROCKIES are going to a FOUR-MAN ROTATION. In one stroke, Dan O'Dowd has mixed together two of the most compelling issues in baseball analysis today--how to win at altitude, and how to optimize the usage of your pitchers.
March 3, 2004
by Rany Jazayerli
So to understand the methods we use to analyze pitcher usage, it's important to appreciate that while every team in baseball today employs essentially the same usage pattern--starting pitchers work in a five-man rotation, with four or five days of rest between starts, and never relieving in between--that usage pattern is far from the norm historically. As recently as 30 years ago, starters were expected to start every fourth day, with only three days of rest between starts. This does not appear to have had a detrimental effect on the pitchers of that era; in fact, over half of the 300-game winners of the live-ball era were in the prime of their careers in the early 1970s. There is no definitive proof that pitching in any kind of rotation is a necessary ingredient for successful pitching staffs. Through the 1950s, starting pitchers would routinely get six or seven days off to pitch against a team they matched up favorably against, then return to the mound on just two days' rest for their next start. There is no evidence that starting pitchers who relieve on their days off between starts suffer adversely for doing so. Starting pitchers routinely made 10 or 15 relief appearances a season for the better part of half a century.
March 2, 2004
by Rany Jazayerli
In the beginning, there were no rotations. There were no relievers. There was only one pitcher, and the term "everyday player" had no meaning. In 1876, George Bradley started all 64 games for the St. Louis Brown Stockings, completing 63 of them; his teammates combined to throw four innings all year.
Of course, in the early days of the National League, the task performed by the pitcher bore little resemblance to what we call "pitching" today. At various times in the first two decades of professional baseball, the distance from the pitcher to home plate was less than 50 feet; a walk required nine balls; bunts that landed in fair territory before skidding to the backstop were considered fair balls; hitters could call for a "high" or "low" pitch; pitchers could throw the ball from a running start; and curveballs and overhand pitches were illegal.
The game changed quickly, and it quickly became impossible for a team to rely on a single pitcher for its entire season. And once that point was reached, the question of how best to maximize each pitcher's usage was born.
February 24, 2004
by Rany Jazayerli
After some 28,000 words of spirited debate in Parts I through IV of the Top 50 Roundtable, Baseball Prospectus unveils its Top 50 Prospects list. Rany Jazayerli will be along tonight to discuss.
December 11, 2003
by Rany Jazayerli
Following up on yesterday's article, here is the definitive list of every transaction made at last weekend's Mock Winter Meetings in Chicago. The list of moves includes a blockbuster trade for Mark Teixeira, cheap contracts for Trot Nixon and Juan Gonzalez, and a surprise new home for Vladimir Guerrero.
December 10, 2003
by Rany Jazayerli
A week before representatives from all 30 teams descend upon New Orleans for the annual winter meetings, a collection of equally knowledgeable but considerably less experienced men and women--our readers--gathered at a restaurant in Chicago with the same purpose: to craftily mold their teams' rosters, through canny trading and judicious use of the free-agent market, into the best team that money--a strictly budgeted amount of money--could buy. And like any good reality TV show, there were a couple of twists along the way. The mechanisms of the event were simple. The first 30 attendees to sign up were assigned a team in advance, and instructed to pore over their team's roster, look over the free-agent market, and come to the event prepared to wheel and deal. Each team was also given a firm budget number in advance that they could not exceed. The event began with each team announcing its list of non-tendered players, who then immediately went into the free-agent pile. All free agents were then represented by the remaining attendees, along with myself and Nate Silver. Will Carroll presided over the event, playing the unenviable role of Bud Selig.
October 16, 2003
by Rany Jazayerli
A lot has happened since last we met. I've completed my residency, started a new job, passed my boards, and moved to Chicago. Which, given my proven attraction to lost causes, meant that it was only a matter of time before I became a Cubs fan.
My allegiance to this team may only be three months old, spanning less than 0.5% of the time since their last World Series appearance. But thanks to Dusty Baker, my patience is already wearing thin.
After a Game Seven performance that would make Jim Frey look like a tactical genius, the hope here is that a couple chinks may be starting to form on Baker's Teflon coating. His failings are well-covered, here and elsewhere, but indulge me in this quick synopsis nonetheless.
May 6, 2003
by Rany Jazayerli
Welcome to the third and final instalment of my look at the meaningfulness of the first few dozen games of a team season. (Go back and review Parts 1 and 2 here. There will be a test later.) This final article looks to merge a team's starting record with its established performance over the past few years, to come up with a formula that most accurately projects its final record based on the available data. Warning: If you thought Part 2 was laden with too many equations, you're not going to like Part 3 any better.
I ended Part 2 with a projection that the Royals, based on their 17-5 start, are projected to finish with about 97 wins. The folly with that logic should be self-evident, but let me share some evidence with you to make the point a little more clear.
When the Royals' record reached 13-3, my inner circle of fellow Royals fans finally got serious about questioning whether such a strong start really meant anything in light of the team's 100-loss season in 2002. I decided to look for comparable teams throughout history that had gotten off to a similar start. Using my database of all teams from 1930 to 1999, I found a total of 75 teams that started the season either 12-4, 13-3, or 14-2. Sixty-three of those teams, or 84%, finished above .500. As a group, they finished with a .545 winning percentage.
But it's not all roses. Because I then whittled down that group to look only at those teams that had played less than .420 ball the previous season, which corresponds to a 68-94 record or worse.
April 28, 2003
by Rany Jazayerli
Welcome to Part 2 of our look at the importance of hot starts. If you haven't already, read Part 1 first. We'll wait for you to get back.
Last time, I looked at how teams fared at season's end after starting the season with a particular record, varying the data by looking at starts of varying lengths. While I pointed out general trends in the data (as well as the exceptions that proved the rule), I did not sum up the data concisely into a single, coherent formula to predict a team's final record. That's what today's article is about. In Part 3--yes, there will be a Part 3--I want to examine how the interaction between a team's record at the start of the season, and its record the previous season, affects its final winning percentage.
April 22, 2003
by Rany Jazayerli
Today, I want to look at the relevance of a hot start on a team's overall winning record. (I know--where do I get these ideas?)
As I write this, the aliens who have collectively taken over the Kansas City Royals' entire roster are 14-3, the best start in team history. Not to be outdone, the Yankees are 15-3 and have outhomered their opponents this year by the miniscule margin of 35 to 4, which is a stat that deserves its own DTN article, if not its own episode of The X-Files. And both teams are trying to keep up with the Giants, who after Sunday's loss are 15-3 despite outscoring their opponents by the downright-reasonable margin of just 107 to 81.
The topic of the meaningfulness of hot starts has intrigued analysts since the Tigers' remarkable 35-5 start in 1984 persuaded Bill James to look at the subject in his 1985 Abstract. One of the major problems with this sort of data analysis is just getting the data for the day-by-day standings for every day in baseball history. James, working by hand, only had data from 1965 to 1984, but then he did not have the services of the incomparable, indispensable David W. Smith (the W. stands for "Support Project Retrosheet!"), who graciously provided me with just the data I needed.
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