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December 20, 2007

Schrodinger's Bat

The Issue of the Day, and Ranging into the Outfield

by Dan Fox

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"Athletes who are chemically propelled to victory do not merely overvalue winning, they misunderstand why winning is properly valued."
George Will, "Barry Bonds' Enhancement," Newsweek, May 21, 2007

From the day in February when pitchers and catchers reported, all the way through the release of the Mitchell Report last week, nary a day went by without something interesting for the fan to follow in 2007. So for this final column of the year, we'll look both at on-field and off-field issues with a pair of topics that couldn't be more different from one another. First, I'll editorialize a bit on the Mitchell report, and then we'll dive into the sometimes murky world of outfield defense as we continue our series on Simple Fielding Runs (SFR).

An Era Defined

Before we dig into today's topic, it's appropriate to spill a little more ink on the subject of the Mitchell report. Although mine is probably a minority opinion among analysts of the game at sites like ours, my take on the report and its contents is largely positive. Further, although many people look dimly on the historical aspects of the report while praising the recommendations, it is precisely that look back--in at least some of its gory details--that appropriately frames the discussion on how to move forward.

For me the most relevant passage in the entire discussion of PEDs is the quote on page 60 (in the PDF version) by Bart Giamatti. It gets to the core of all of the scrutiny by the media and the concern of fans, and is what should propel the part of Major League Baseball and the player's association to more fully address the issue:

. . . acts of cheating are intended to alter the very conditions of play to favor one person. They are secretive, covert acts that strike at and seek to undermine the basic foundation of any contest declaring the winner--that all participants play under identical rules and conditions. Acts of cheating destroy that necessary foundation and thus strike at the essence of a contest. They destroy faith in the games' integrity and fairness; if participants and spectators alike cannot assume integrity and fairness, and proceed from there, the contest cannot in its essence exist.

In the final analysis, this assault on the integrity of the game is the reason that PEDs pose such a threat to the sport, and why it was incumbent on Major League Baseball to give at least some accounting of the scope and nature of the problem. In a cynical age--where increasing revenues are thought to excuse any behavior and justify our looking away--that view may seem simple-minded. But an issue that is allowed to eat away at the very essence of the sport (whether or not we give it much consideration) will surely eventually destroy it. It is for this reason fans need to understand, in broad terms anyway, how large the problem was at its height in order to come to terms with how much that foundation was under assault. It seems to me that the Mitchell Report performs this function nicely by striking a balance between chasing down many possible violations, providing convincing evidence of the reality and extent of the problem, and framing the report in a historical context.

Contrary to the opinion of my colleague Joe Sheehan, I don't believe that the report "put little to no blame on upper management of teams or the game itself" and "instead elected to blame the MLBPA and its members as obstructionists." As I read it, pages 108 through 159 are one long indictment of all levels within the operating structure of Major League Baseball. The report documents that, from the top to bottom, the chain of authority continuously buried their collective head in the sand, cowered in the face of the MLBPA, didn't enforce or even communicate their own policies, and generally encouraged the proliferation of a problem that was becoming increasingly obvious, a problem documented by the concurrent media stories mentioned in the report.

In my view, Mitchell strongly makes the case that it wasn't only the MLBPA being obstructionist (which they were, especially in regards to the laughable "reasonable cause" testing in place before the 2002 CBA) that allowed the problem to get out of hand. By citing example after example of situations involving people who could have and should have taken action in various ways, it highlights the questionable behavior of a whole host of non-players at nearly every level. It starts at the very top with Bud Selig himself (who, the report noted, said in 1995 at a time he should have and probably did know better "[i]f baseball has a problem, I must say candidly that we were not aware of it... It certainly hasn't been talked about much"), and continues down the line with Fay Vincent, Sandy Alderson, Tony La Russa, Dave McKay, Lee Thomas (the former Phillies GM), Jeff Cooper (the former Phillies head trainer), Randy Smith (when he was Padres GM), Brian Sabean (Giants GM), Kevin Hallinan (baseball's security director), Bruce Bochy, Phil Garner, Tom Kelly, Dr. Robert Millman (physician who served as the medical director for MLB), and Rob Manfred, not to mention various clubhouse attendants, equipment managers, and other club athletic trainers. One gets the impression from reading these pages that all of the relevant information and warning signs were well-known within the industry by the mid 1990s, and that the failure to act and head off another stain on the game can be laid in equal proportions at the feet of both MLB and the MLBPA.

In the testimony of Kirk Radomski and Brian McNamee the evidence paints a picture of at least some of the avenues through which PEDs entered the game, how they were distributed, and the informal networks and word of mouth through which they spread. Although clearly just a small sample of the activities that were and--to some extent--still are no doubt going on, it appears their main purpose was to directly support some of the recommendations, including the establishment of a Department of Investigations, screening and testing of clubhouse personnel, logging of packages, and an expanded power to interview players. From that perspective, the names of the 90 or so players was less an attack on players in general and instead critical support of the arguments the report was making. That is, the names and documents were provided to unambiguously authenticate the nature and extent of the problem (and it also gives us insight into the demographic breakdown in terms of positions, age, and performance level) thereby underscoring the need to implement changes. But just as importantly, what the report did correctly was that in providing a smaller number of names (whether by design or lack of cooperation) that was not overwhelming and encouraging the commissioner to "forego imposing discipline on players for past violations," it balanced the need to come clean about the past with the need to move forward.

In the end, my take is that not only was the report necessary and should serve as the bookend to the unconstrained problem of PEDs in baseball, but fans can be encouraged as we move forward. Although no urine test for HGH is available, the report points out that the testing programs at both at the minor (p. 94) and major league levels have been effective, showing an overall decrease in the number of positives, as illustrated in the table below that shows the results of the minor league testing program that began in 2001:

Minor League Test Results
Year   Tests     Pos    Pct
2001    4850     439    9.1%
2002    4719     227    4.8%
2003    4772     173    3.6%
2004    4801      78    1.6%
2005    5961     106    1.8%
2006    6433      23    0.4%

Here's hoping we can look forward to a continued restoration of the level playing field upon which baseball, like all sports, is built.

Ranging into the Outfield

And now on to today's second topic. Several weeks ago, a comment on the throwing arm of new Twins outfielder Delmon Young led to the creation of a fielding system I dubbed "Simple Fielding Runs" (SFR), based on the kind of play-by-play data available in Retrosheet-style play by play logs. Both in the initial column and in last week's column, I made first cuts at developing the system for infielders. Finally, however, the patience of some readers (and you know who you are) will be rewarded as we take a stab at the outfield and, as a bonus, try and complete the picture with outfielder's throwing prowess.

As an aside, I should mention that although I wasn't aware of it, Angels fan and blogger Sean Smith had published results from a similar system back in April, and it now appears he's providing 2007 results. It'll be interesting to see how closely these two systems correlate.

As mentioned above, this system is based on play-by-play data, and therefore does not have the benefit of zone data, which for the likes of Baseball Info Solutions (BIS) or STATS, Inc. form the major component of systems like Mitchell Lichtman's Ultimate Zone Rating (UZR), ESPN's Zone Rating (ZR), David Pinto's Probabilistic Model of Range (PMR), and Shane Jensen's Spatial Aggregate Fielding Evaluation (SAFE). In order to compensate for this deficiency, we instead create virtual "areas of responsibility" based on the fielder who fielded the ball. While this leads to partitioning rules for infielders whose areas of responsibility are more likely to overlap, we don't have the same problem to the same degree in the outfield, where the areas are larger and there is less overlap. This allows us to simplify the methodology somewhat, with the result that we'll assign only balls that were fielded by an outfielder to his area of responsibility. In order to come up with a measuring stick to use to measure an outfielder, we'll then compare how frequently batted balls in his area are turned into outs as compared to his peers by constructing a baseline matrix in much the same way we did for infielders. And not only will we look at the conversion of balls into outs, but we'll also see how many bases that typically translates into in order to convert the difference into runs.

We do have another kind of problem in dealing with outfielders that does not plague infielders, however, and that of course is the differences in the ballparks in which they play. Obviously, ceteris paribus, in outfields that are more spacious more balls will drop for hits. In a recent article by Lichtman, he showed that Coors Field has an outfield area of roughly 118,000 square feet at the high end, while the outfield at Philadelphia's Citizen's Bank Park is at just 104,000; that's a difference of almost 12 percent. Fenway Park, of course, is an exception, since although its dimensions are short to left field the number of batted balls that become hits is very high due to the frequency with which they hit off the Green Monster. To account for these differences, we'll create three-year park factors; after applying our matrix, we'll then apply the park factors to each and every batted ball fielded by an outfielder. Let's now dig down into each of these areas.

Peer Pressure

As with infielders, the baseline matrix we create will incorporate several attributes, including the position to which the ball was hit, the type of hit (line drive, ground ball, fly ball, and popup), and the handedness of the batter. By aggregating all balls hit to each position and then calculating the percentage of times the batter reached base along with the number of bases gained per ball hit, we can create a matrix like that shown in Table 1 for left fielders in 2007:

Table 1: Left Fielders in 2007
Type   Bats    Balls  Runners    TB     Out%  Bases/Ball
F       L       5526     794    1249    .856     0.23
F       R       4466     870    1457    .805     0.33
-----------------------------------------------------
G       L        796     794     913    .003     1.15
G       R       3108    3108    3739    .000     1.20
-----------------------------------------------------
L       L       2647    2096    2652    .208     1.00
L       R       5295    4546    6063    .141     1.15
-----------------------------------------------------
P       L          1       1       1    .000     1.00
P       R          2       2       3    .000     1.50
-----------------------------------------------------
Total          21841   12211   16077    .441     0.74

For left fielders, line drives hit by right-handed hitters are more difficult to convert into outs than are line drives by lefties. The same can be said of fly balls, presumably both because of the way the ball comes off the bat of a lefty when hit to the opposite field and because the ball is typically hit softer, a point backed up by the fact that the table shows that right-handed hitters gain more bases than their sinister counterparts on average in all three scenarios. Given this, you won't be surprised to learn that a matrix for right-fielders shows exactly the opposite, with lefties having more success, and that for center fielders the differences are minimal.

To illustrate how the matrix is used, we'll take the example of Pirates left fielder Jason Bay. In 2007 Bay fielded 286 fly balls, 117 grounders, and 282 line drives while playing left field in 138 equivalent nine-inning games. Table 2--further broken down by batter handedness--lists the number of runners that reached base, the total number of bases gained by those runners compared with how many runners and bases we would expect for an average left fielder in 2007, along with the run value assigned to each scenario:

Table 2: Jason Bay in 2007
Hit  Bats      Balls Runners      TB ExRunners    ExTB     SFR
G       L         14      14      19       14       16    -1.0
G       R        103     103     117      103      124     2.3
--------------------------------------------------------------
F       L        124      14      20       18       28     4.2
F       R        162      40      71       32       53    -9.5
--------------------------------------------------------------
L       L         72      59      73       57       72    -1.1
L       R        210     189     255      180      240    -8.4
--------------------------------------------------------------
Total            685     419     555      404      533   -13.4

In order to compare Bay to the average left fielder and convert these values into runs, we then multiply the difference between the number of expected hits and actual hits by 0.74 (the linear weights value of an out converted into a single) and add this to the difference between the expected number of total bases and actual total bases minus the expected number of hits multiplied by 0.33. We're essentially crediting each hit saved or given up as a single and then converting as many of those to doubles as the number of total bases saved or given up indicates, since the difference between the value of a double (1.07) and a single is 0.33.

What I like about this system is that it has the potential to account for the ability of outfielders to cut off balls in the gaps and hold runners to singles and doubles. In fact, Bay scored well in this category in 2007, as he picked up over a run on grounders by holding the opposition to 136 total bases in these scenarios, as opposed to an expected total of 140.

It should be remembered, though, that by assigning only those balls fielded by the outfielder to his area of responsibility, we are not accounting for the fact that some outfielders expand their zones by covering more ground and taking balls away from either middle infielders (pop flies) or other outfielders (on fly balls, line drives, and ground balls). To that extent, this metric doesn't give additional credit to "ball hogs" which, depending on your point of view, is either a good or bad thing.

As you can see from Table 2, Bay also did well on fly balls hit by left-handers, although his performance on fly balls (-9.5) and line drives (-8.4) by righties sinks his overall total to -13.4 runs.

More Context

After running the algorithm described above on all outfielders, we end up with an "unadjusted" SFR total. The total is unadjusted, since we haven't yet considered the ballparks.

To account for this context we can create a matrix like Table 1 for each park. For example, at PNC Park from 2005-2007 we find the breakdown for left field to look like this:

Table 3: PNC Park Left Field 2005-2007
Type Bats      Balls  Runners    TB     Out%  Bases/Ball
F       L        412      71     112    .828     0.27
F       R        580     124     227    .786     0.39
-----------------------------------------------------
G       L         52      52      60    .000     1.15
G       R        317     317     371    .000     1.17
-----------------------------------------------------
L       L        201     158     198    .214     0.99
L       R        638     553     710    .133     1.11
-----------------------------------------------------
Totals          2200    1275    1678    .420     0.76

You can see that overall the out percentage was lower at PNC than for the league as a whole. However, comparing this to the league average wouldn't be sufficient since this data set includes an over-representation of Pirates left fielders and, with the unbalanced schedule, all left fielders in the NL Central. If Bay and these others are simply worse than average fielders, we may end up assuming that at PNC it is tougher to turn batted balls into outs. By comparing these percentages to those for all Pirates road games during the period we can calculate park factors for each scenario, as shown in Table 4:

Table 4: PNC Park Factors for Left Field 2005-2007
               Road                    Home
Type Bats      Balls Runners      TB   Balls  Runners      TB ReachPF    TBPF
F       L        398      53      83     412       71     112    1.29    1.30
F       R        496     101     174     580      124     227    1.05    1.12
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
G       L         47      47      54      52       52      60    1.00    1.00
G       R        332     332     401     317      317     371    1.00    0.97
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
L       L        201     158     195     201      158     198    1.00    1.02
L       R        604     521     706     638      553     710    1.00    0.95

Before anyone emails me, yes, there were exactly the same number of line drives hit by left-handed batters at home and on the road (201) and exactly the same number of runners reached base (158). Strange but true.

The two columns on the right indicate the ratio of home to road; a ReachPF value 1.29 indicates that runners reached base more frequently on fly balls hit by lefties at PNC park than on the road. Right-handed hitters did likewise, but the magnitude (1.05) of the difference is smaller. Overall, left field at PNC ranked fifth in baseball in highest ReachPF in 2005-2007 with a value of 1.18 while left field at Fenway Park took the top spot at 1.31. Right field at the Great American Ballpark had the lowest ReachPF at 0.85.

Armed with these ratios we can now apply the park factors to each and every ball fielded by an outfielder. In other words, rather than apply one factor for a player's home park globally after making the calculations we did in Table 2, we'll instead apply individual park factors at the most granular level. To do this, we simply multiply the expected number of runners and total bases by the appropriate park factors and subtract the actual number of runners and total bases. So for a park factor greater than 1.00 we expect more runners to reach, so we end up not penalizing a fielder for seemingly allowing more runners to reach base. To calculate the run values we use the same algorithm as described above.

For Jason Bay, that means applying the factor to the 99 different scenarios that he encountered in 2007, taking into consideration the ballpark, position, hit type, and batter hand. When we do so and then sum all of these adjustments by hit type and batter handedness, we come up with the results in Table 5 for Bay in left field in 2007:

Table 5: Jason Bay, Left Field 2007
                                    UnAdjusted           Park Adjusted
Type Bats      Balls Runners     TB ExRunner  ExTB   SFR ExRunner  ExTB   SFR
F       L        124      14     20      18     28   4.2      20     31   6.0
F       R        162      40     71      32     53  -9.5      32     55  -8.8
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
G       L         14      14     19      14     16  -1.0      14     16  -1.0
G       R        103     103    117     103    124   2.3     103    122   1.5
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
L       L         72      59     73      57     72  -1.1      57     72  -0.9
L       R        210     189    255     180    240  -8.4     181    234 -10.1
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Totals           685     419    555     404    533 -13.4     407    530 -13.3

As you can see, his total didn't change much at all, going from -13.4 unadjusted to -13.3 when we consider the park. That is not the case, of course, for other outfielders. For example, Manny Ramirez goes from a -21.0 unadjusted SFR to -2.6 once his park context is accounted for, with the entire magnitude of the difference coming from the Fenway Park adjustment. Overall, Bay ranked third from the bottom for left fielders, ahead of only Pat Burrell (-14.4) and Chris Duncan (-17.7).

The Results

With the calculations complete we can now show the leaders and trailers for each outfield position in 2007:

Table 6: Outfielders playing in 80 or more adjusted games in 2007
Name               Pos     AdjG    Balls     SFR
------------------------------------------------
Matt Holliday      Left    154.3     672    18.9
Eric Byrnes        Left    108.4     464    17.5
Alfonso Soriano    Left    118.7     551    12.9
Shannon Stewart    Left    128.7     603     9.9
Ryan Church        Left     80.3     408     9.5
Garret Anderson    Left     80.6     334     6.7
Carl Crawford      Left    132.4     626     5.4
Craig Monroe       Left     89.9       4     0.8
Hideki Matsui      Left    109.1     499    -0.5
Jay Payton         Left    100.7     514    -1.2
Craig Monroe       Left     89.9     381    -2.2
Manny Ramirez      Left    110.8     464    -2.6
Carlos Lee         Left    152.6     663    -3.4
Geoff Jenkins      Left    108.8     537    -4.3
Luis Gonzalez      Left    111.0     464    -5.6
Adam Dunn          Left    132.6     605    -7.2
Barry Bonds        Left     93.6     370    -8.2
Josh Willingham    Left    131.6     562    -9.7
Raul Ibanez        Left    123.9     578   -12.1
Jason Bay          Left    138.0     685   -13.3
Pat Burrell        Left    114.7     469   -14.4
Chris Duncan       Left     83.3     405   -17.7
------------------------------------------------
Coco Crisp         Center  135.3     715    34.9
Carlos Beltran     Center  138.2     712    21.7
Melky Cabrera      Center  119.7     682    14.7
David DeJesus      Center  150.8     760    12.6
Grady Sizemore     Center  157.2     793    12.2
Nook Logan         Center   84.4     446    11.6
Vernon Wells       Center  142.9     628     6.7
Gary Matthews Jr.  Center  127.3     715     0.4
Jim Edmonds        Center   92.1     479    -1.7
Corey Patterson    Center  117.8     534    -1.8
Andruw Jones       Center  150.2     748    -3.2
Curtis Granderson  Center  143.4     823    -3.3
Dave Roberts       Center   84.3     435    -6.1
Mike Cameron       Center  148.0     746    -6.1
Aaron Rowand       Center  153.1     780    -6.8
Hunter Pence       Center   94.1     494    -6.9
Juan Pierre        Center  157.9     748    -8.3
Torii Hunter       Center  146.4     780    -8.4
Ichiro Suzuki      Center  148.9     812    -8.8
Bill Hall          Center  114.4     592   -12.4
Chris Young        Center  140.7     729   -12.9
------------------------------------------------
Luke Scott         Right    91.3     391    19.5
Vladimir Guerrero  Right   103.6     415    14.1
Austin Kearns      Right   153.6     729    14.0
J.D. Drew          Right   118.1     427    13.8
Jeremy Hermida     Right   109.8     509    13.1
Magglio Ordonez    Right   136.1     540    10.1
Corey Hart         Right    96.7     472     8.4
Andre Ethier       Right    87.2     383     8.0
Nick Markakis      Right   155.9     642     7.7
Alex Rios          Right   139.7     550     6.8
Brad Hawpe         Right   138.1     547     3.3
Jeff Francoeur     Right   160.7     659     1.4
Shane Victorino    Right   102.6     464    -0.5
Randy Winn         Right    97.2     429    -1.2
Xavier Nady        Right    83.3     334    -3.4
Shawn Green        Right   102.4     405    -5.8
Delmon Young       Right   126.6     540    -6.1
Ken Griffey Jr.    Right   129.8     617    -6.6
Jermaine Dye       Right   128.8     604    -7.0
Michael Cuddyer    Right   136.3     569    -7.2
Jose Guillen       Right   141.6     624   -10.2
Bobby Abreu        Right   148.7     631   -13.5
Mark Teahen        Right   128.6     673   -17.1
Brian Giles        Right   118.3     477   -23.1

This list appears fairly reasonable, with many of the players you might expect bubbling up towards the top, and those like Bay, Bill Hall, and Brian Giles having a characteristically poor showing. What may be surprising is that Ichiro Suzuki would do so poorly at -8.8, although it turns out he also did poorly in UZR in 2007.

Finally, we're ready to do what started this three-week excursion in the first place: combine these SFR numbers with the throwing arm numbers developed for this year's annual in an article titled "Expanding the Cannon: Quantifying the Impact of Outfield Throwing Arms." The result is a total defensive metric for outfielders that incorporates both traditional fielding and throwing into a single number.

So as we enter the holiday break I'll leave you with Table 7, which shows each player's park adjusted SFR along with their Equivalent Throwing Runs (EqThr), which is a total defensive contribution. And for the record, Delmon Young with his combination of poor fielding (-6.1) and good throwing (+9.3) comes out a little to the good, at +3.2 runs overall.

Once again, I'd like to say thanks to all our readers for your support and encouragement in 2007. Here's wishing everyone a very Merry Christmas and we'll see you in the New Year.

Table 7: Total Defense for Outfielders in 2007
Name                  Pos        AdjG    Balls     SFR   EqThr  Total Defense
Alfonso Soriano       Left       118.7     551    12.9    12.7    25.6
Matt Holliday         Left       154.3     672    18.9     1.3    20.2
Eric Byrnes           Left       108.4     464    17.5    -1.5    15.9
Garret Anderson       Left        80.6     334     6.7     2.4     9.1
Ryan Church           Left        80.3     408     9.5    -0.8     8.7
Hideki Matsui         Left       109.1     499    -0.5     3.6     3.1
Carl Crawford         Left       132.4     626     5.4    -2.3     3.1
Craig Monroe          Left        89.9       4     0.8     2.1     2.9
Shannon Stewart       Left       128.7     603     9.9    -8.1     1.9
Craig Monroe          Left        89.9     381    -2.2     2.1    -0.1
Jay Payton            Left       100.7     514    -1.2     0.8    -0.4
Manny Ramirez         Left       110.8     464    -2.6     0.3    -2.3
Carlos Lee            Left       152.6     663    -3.4     0.2    -3.2
Geoff Jenkins         Left       108.8     537    -4.3    -2.0    -6.3
Josh Willingham       Left       131.6     562    -9.7     1.5    -8.2
Luis Gonzalez         Left       111.0     464    -5.6    -3.2    -8.8
Raul Ibanez           Left       123.9     578   -12.1     0.9   -11.2
Barry Bonds           Left        93.6     370    -8.2    -3.4   -11.6
Adam Dunn             Left       132.6     605    -7.2    -5.3   -12.5
Jason Bay             Left       138.0     685   -13.3     0.4   -12.9
Pat Burrell           Left       114.7     469   -14.4     0.6   -13.9
Chris Duncan          Left        83.3     405   -17.7     1.4   -16.3
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Coco Crisp            Center     135.3     715    34.9    -1.2    33.8
Carlos Beltran        Center     138.2     712    21.7    -0.9    20.8
Melky Cabrera         Center     119.7     682    14.7     0.8    15.5
David DeJesus         Center     150.8     760    12.6    -4.5     8.1
Nook Logan            Center      84.4     446    11.6    -3.5     8.1
Grady Sizemore        Center     157.2     793    12.2    -4.6     7.6
Vernon Wells          Center     142.9     628     6.7    -0.4     6.3
Jim Edmonds           Center      92.1     479    -1.7     3.5     1.8
Curtis Granderson     Center     143.4     823    -3.3     4.3     1.0
Andruw Jones          Center     150.2     748    -3.2     4.0     0.8
Corey Patterson       Center     117.8     534    -1.8     1.6    -0.3
Gary Matthews Jr.     Center     127.3     715     0.4    -2.0    -1.6
Ichiro Suzuki         Center     148.9     812    -8.8     6.0    -2.8
Dave Roberts          Center      84.3     435    -6.1    -0.1    -6.3
Aaron Rowand          Center     153.1     780    -6.8     0.4    -6.4
Hunter Pence          Center      94.1     494    -6.9    -0.3    -7.2
Mike Cameron          Center     148.0     746    -6.1    -2.1    -8.2
Bill Hall             Center     114.4     592   -12.4     3.1    -9.2
Torii Hunter          Center     146.4     780    -8.4    -2.6   -11.0
Chris Young           Center     140.7     729   -12.9     0.0   -12.9
Juan Pierre           Center     157.9     748    -8.3    -7.3   -15.6
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Luke Scott            Right       91.3     391    19.5    -0.4    19.1
Alex Rios             Right      139.7     550     6.8     9.2    16.0
J.D. Drew             Right      118.1     427    13.8     1.2    15.0
Jeff Francoeur        Right      160.7     659     1.4    13.1    14.4
Austin Kearns         Right      153.6     729    14.0     0.4    14.3
Vladimir Guerrero     Right      103.6     415    14.1    -0.5    13.6
Jeremy Hermida        Right      109.8     509    13.1     0.0    13.0
Nick Markakis         Right      155.9     642     7.7     2.3    10.1
Magglio Ordonez       Right      136.1     540    10.1    -2.3     7.8
Shane Victorino       Right      102.6     464    -0.5     7.6     7.1
Andre Ethier          Right       87.2     383     8.0    -1.1     6.9
Delmon Young          Right      126.6     540    -6.1     9.3     3.2
Michael Cuddyer       Right      136.3     569    -7.2     9.9     2.7
Corey Hart            Right       96.7     472     8.4    -6.4     2.0
Brad Hawpe            Right      138.1     547     3.3    -4.9    -1.6
Randy Winn            Right       97.2     429    -1.2    -1.6    -2.7
Xavier Nady           Right       83.3     334    -3.4    -3.7    -7.1
Jose Guillen          Right      141.6     624   -10.2     2.0    -8.2
Shawn Green           Right      102.4     405    -5.8    -4.0    -9.8
Mark Teahen           Right      128.6     673   -17.1     6.7   -10.4
Jermaine Dye          Right      128.8     604    -7.0    -5.2   -12.2
Bobby Abreu           Right      148.7     631   -13.5     1.1   -12.4
Ken Griffey Jr.       Right      129.8     617    -6.6    -7.8   -14.5
Brian Giles           Right      118.3     477   -23.1    -7.8   -31.0

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