Two months ago, the Oakland Athletics signed Eric Chavez to a six-year, $66 million contract extension that will keep him with the club through 2010. Despite some head-scratching from the public, there are good reasons behind why Billy Beane campaigned to do for Chavez what he hadn’t done for former MVP shortstop Miguel Tejada. Unlike Tejada, Chavez is a player whose skills, like his fine defense and his ever-improving plate discipline, are likely to be undervalued by the market. On top of which, Chavez has continued to demonstrate growth season after season, and PECOTA thinks that he’s a very safe bet going forward.
It is no secret, however, that Chavez has a tragic flaw: he can’t hit left-handed pitching. From 2001-2003, Chavez managed a stellar line of .306/.375/.579 against right-handers, but a Mathenian .229/.278/.395 against southpaws. The A’s, recognizing his defensive value and perhaps hoping that repetition would breed improvement, continued to start him anyway, in spite of a rotating array of viable platoon alternatives.
This year, indeed, has brought about a turnaround–Chavez is crushing lefties so far on the season (.288/.373/.561), while performing well below his career averages against righties (.214/.358/.398). Whether there’s any rationale for the change other than sample size, I’m not certain (I don’t get to see the West Coast teams play as often as I’d like to). What is clear, however, is that if such a change becomes permanent–if Chavez learns how to hit left-handed pitching at the age of 26–it would be a relatively unprecedented development. In most cases, a platoon split for a left-handed hitter is something like a finger print or a dental record: it remains a readily identifiable and more or less unchanging part of his profile throughout the different stages of his playing life. A left-handed hitter with a big platoon split early in his career is, in all likelihood, going to have a big platoon split later in his career.
Though most folks have been aware of the importance of the platoon advantage for a long, long time, the development patterns of left-handed hitters–particularly left-handed hitters who don’t hit left-handed pitchers very well–remains an under-explored subject area. As a result, I’m going to run a three-part series on the issue. Today, we’ll look at a sample of historical players, providing a narrative description of the progress of their platoon splits throughout their early and middle careers. In the second part of the series, to run next week or not too long afterward, we’ll look at the historical data in a more systematic fashion. I’d like to run a third part to the series, too, describing potential “solutions” to the problem, but that depends on how the second part goes. In the meantime, kids, grab a blanket and a Hi-C: it’s time for Southpaw Stories.
Retrosheet has comprehensive data on platoon splits available for each year from 1969 through 1992. There are about 35 left-handed hitters who had their age 22-30 seasons during the era, and who were major league regulars throughout most of that period. I randomly selected a sample of 10 such players to examine further. The lucky contestants are:
- Chris Chambliss
- Keith Hernandez
- Kent Hrbek
- Tony Gwynn
- Ruppert Jones
- Rick Manning
- Al Oliver
- Darryl Strawberry
- Jason Thompson
- Andy Van Slyke
Though the list was not cherry-picked for diversity–when I say something is random, I mean it: Nate Knows Random–it happens to contain a good mix of starts and scrubs, power hitters and slap hitters, short-career and long-career players. Let’s start from the bottom of the alphabet (there’s something uninspiring about Chris Chambliss, even years after the fact) and move upward, looking at each player’s platoon differential up until he hit the age of 30:
Andy Van Slyke
OPS vs. Year Age RHP LHP ------------------ 1983 22 787 726 1984 23 720 745 1985 24 841 306 1986 25 854 643 1987 26 1012 650 1988 27 1005 558 1989 28 667 697 1990 29 893 730 1991 30 904 626
Even as his career was taking off–Van Slyke developed rapidly between the ages of 24 and 26, especially after being traded to Pittsburgh in 1987–his production against left-handed pitchers remained stuck in neutral. Indeed, if you look at Andy’s progress over time…
It’s almost as if you’re dealing with two entirely different players. One version, the one who plays only against left-handed pitchers, shows some promise out of the gate, but never really develops into anything, hanging on the big league fringe because he plays an OK center field and runs the bases well. The other version becomes a full-blown offensive star, with a peak at the usual ages of 26 and 27, and several productive years thereafter. This pattern, wherein a player’s development patterns against left-handed and right-handed pitching appear to be operating separately from one another, is a common one.
Jason Thompson
OPS vs. Year Age RHP LHP ------------------ 1976 21 781 479 1977 22 998 639 1978 23 915 757 1979 24 793 629 1980 25 961 569 1981 26 908 865 1982 27 998 652 1983 28 821 666 1984 29 785 621 1985 30 758 724
Thompson was a slugger in the Adam Dunn mold: behemoth of a guy, reached the big leagues young, loads of walks and strikeouts, loads of power, sometimes struggled with his batting average. Unlike Dunn, who has posted surprisingly equivocal platoon splits, Thompson struggled mightily against left-handers. Making matters worse, he had the misfortune to be playing in a league in which the percentage of southpaw pitchers was very high–in 1978, for example, Thompson had more at bats against lefties than he did against righties. Save for a fluskish, 45 at-bat performance in 1981, Thompson’s ability to hit lefties never came.
Darryl Strawberry
OPS vs. Year Age RHP LHP ------------------ 1983 21 889 714 1984 22 889 637 1985 23 1005 854 1986 24 1006 649 1987 25 1078 847 1988 26 930 878 1989 27 1012 650 1990 28 814 717 1991 29 890 881
The Straw presents a more optimistic picture for Chavez. Although he always maintained a large platoon differential–the batting average, power, and plate discipline components of his line were all substantially diminished against lefties–there were some signs that his game against lefties was developing, as he posted an OPS of 847 or higher against them on four occasions prior to the untimely demise of his career (1991 was Darryl’s last full season).
Al Oliver
OPS vs. Year Age RHP LHP ------------------ 1969 22 804 753 1970 23 775 646 1971 24 797 686 1972 25 810 738 1973 26 854 623 1974 27 877 752 1975 28 785 734 1976 29 878 764 1977 30 911 676
A remarkably consistent line-drive hitter, Oliver held his own against lefties throughout most seasons of his career, usually maintaining a “small” platoon differential of around 100 points of OPS. One question that we’ll try and answer in this series is whether some types of hitters routinely have larger platoon splits than others.
Rick Manning
OPS vs. Year Age RHP LHP ------------------ 1975 20 775 557 1976 21 727 736 1977 22 712 389 1978 23 677 545 1979 24 669 522 1980 25 735 426 1981 26 722 527 1982 27 699 666 1983 28 672 518 1984 29 711 609 1985 30 545 650
Manning was a Tom Goodwin for the disco era–good defense, good speed, not much hit. If BP had been around back in the early-’80s, we probably would have made fun of him. Then again, there are unconfirmed reports that Gary Huckabay had a mullet back in the early-’80s.
In any event, lest it be thought that platoon splits are reserved for big, “one-dimensional” sluggers like Jason Thompson, Manning had one of the biggest platoon differentials of the bunch. While Manning’s development pattern was unusual–he had his two best seasons at ages 20 and 21–he was absolutely atrocious against left-handed pitching throughout his career, in spite of accumulating significant playing time for managers who thought highly of his defense and intangibles.
Ruppert Jones
OPS vs. Year Age RHP LHP ------------------ 1977 22 843 639 1978 23 709 540 1979 24 819 758 1980 25 830 511 1981 26 721 605 1982 27 873 628 1983 28 790 355 1984 29 879 500 1985 30 796 625
Jones never hit lefties, but it wasn’t for lack of trying–he didn’t become a platoon player until the Padres wisely moved him into that role in 1983. Jones, who ran well and played a palatable center field, was always regarded as a multidimensional (e.g., “five tool”) player. Is it possible that managers are more reluctant to resign that type of player to a platoon arrangement than they would be a slow, chubby power hitter? In any event, his is another data point in the case against Chavez’ development.
Tony Gwynn
OPS vs. Year Age RHP LHP ------------------ 1983 23 772 559 1984 24 918 724 1985 25 805 705 1986 26 814 907 1987 27 998 903 1988 28 833 716 1989 29 869 700 1990 30 831 680
Gwynn was a remarkable player in many ways, including his ability to improve his performance against left-handed pitching–note the dramatic improvement from 1983 until 1987. While all the usual sample size caveats apply–it would be easy to make too much of a good run of a few hundred at-bats against lefties at the ages of 26 and 27–it might not be a coincidence that Gwynn was one of the most deliberate and hard-working hitters in the game, constantly reviewing tape and tinkering with his approach throughout his career. While Gwynn lost a little bit of whatever power he had against lefties, and drew fewer walks, he was able to maintain outstanding batting averages against them in almost every season.
Kent Hrbek
OPS vs. Year Age RHP LHP ------------------ 1982 22 868 804 1983 23 863 838 1984 24 927 863 1985 25 829 726 1986 26 876 715 1987 27 1043 660 1988 28 974 715 1989 29 892 842 1990 30 891 734
It would be hard to conceive of two players who were closer to polar opposites than Gwynn and Hrbek–both had a little baby fat by the end of their careers, I guess.
In any event, Hrbek started out well enough against lefties, posting small platoon differentials in his first three full seasons, before bottoming out against them during his peak; his is another case in which the two sides to a player’s batting line appear to be operating on separate tracks from one another.
Keith Hernandez
OPS vs. Year Age RHP LHP ------------------ 1976 22 837 729 1977 23 813 880 1978 24 709 798 1979 25 944 908 1980 26 849 996 1981 27 948 713 1982 28 844 742 1983 29 867 745 1984 30 927 733
Hernandez was not an entirely dissimilar player from Chavez, and so his experience makes for an interesting precedent. Hernandez started out just fine against lefties–in 1977, 1978, and 1980, in fact, he put up a reverse platoon split. But in 1981, even though he had a full decade left to go as an All-Star caliber performer, Hernandez bottomed out against lefties and never recovered (if we extend the chart out a few more years, his platoon differential remains more or less the same). What triggered the change, I don’t know; Hernandez, though he might have gone through a few lifestyle changes over time, was a very consistent player throughout his career. But it looks to be statistically significant.
Chris Chambliss
OPS vs. Year Age RHP LHP ------------------ 1971 22 795 662 1972 23 825 593 1973 24 797 584 1974 25 692 567 1975 26 831 663 1976 27 728 781 1977 28 843 700 1978 29 698 708 1979 30 866 624
Chambliss exhibits something of the opposite pattern to Hernandez: after struggling against lefties early in his career, he began to hit them notably better after being traded to the New York in the middle of the 1974 season. Chambliss was the first overall draft-pick in 1970, and the Indians did not platoon him early in his career despite his struggles–a move that might have been to their detriment, and the benefit of the Yankees.
* * *
I hope that was a worthwhile exercise; I haven’t looked at this sort of data before, and I suspect that most of you haven’t either. But it leaves us with more questions than answers: Most left-handed hitters display stagnant development against lefties throughout their careers, but what distinguishes the ones like Gwynn who break the mold? What about hitters like Hrbek and Van Slyke whose performance seems to regress against lefties? Does being platooned early in one’s career kill an individual’s capacity for development? Stay tuned for the next installment.
Thank you for reading
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