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I went to the College World Series in Omaha this week, and one thing I learned there is that, even though tickets to the event can be quite expensive, T.D. Ameritrade Park is a very popular place for area high schoolers to hang out! Like, there were a bunch of them just hanging out on the center field concourse, not really watching the game or anything, just chillin'. So I also learned this week that I may have been a very popular high schooler had I grown up in Omaha.

Monday

Strikeouts are the most "reliable" of stats (and the quickest to become "reliable), while double…eh, not so much: A New Way to Look at Sample Size, by Jonah Pemstein and Sean Dolinar, Fangraphs

The reliability of each stat increases when the number of PA/AB/BIP increases, and the curve increases at a slower rate as the value gets closer to 1.0. One of the goals of this project is to demonstrate how the reliability of stats changes with number of PA. Most importantly, there is no single point at which a stat becomes stable — every additional PA/AB/BIP simply increases the reliability. Even with a low reliability, there is information within the stat; it just has more noise than a stat with a high reliability.

Tuesday
Throwing over to first makes subsequent steal attempts less successful; makes runners more likely to steal; and all told, is worth about .01 of a run: The Wonderful World of Throwing to First, by Russell Carleton, Baseball Prospectus

Because we know that stolen bases are more likely in some situations than others, I controlled for the inning (entered categorically; steal attempts are more common earlier and later in the game), the number of outs (again, categorical; attempts are more common with fewer than two out), whether there was a runner at third, and whether the game was within three runs in either direction. Even controlling for all that (in a logistic regression), we find that when a pitcher threw over, that runner was more likely to go. In fact, I found that a throw to first was associated with (and the initiated will know exactly why I picked the phrase “associated with”) about a three-percentage-point-greater likelihood that the runner would try to swipe second, controlling for the situation and the runner’s own tendencies.

There are a couple of reasonable theories for this, none of which we can directly prove. One would be the “challenge theory,” which says that a runner might see the throw from the pitcher as a challenge to run. (“Oh… you think I’m going to run? I’ll show you.”) We’ve seen that managers are actually more likely to send a runner after they’ve had one caught stealing; maybe there is a bit of pack animal challenge that goes into all of this.

Wednesday
Good luck teams have been more common than bad luck this season! Just barely, though: Luck's component parts, by Henry Druschel, Beyond the Box Score

To give you a sense of the magnitude, the team hit hardest by this combined measure is Milwaukee, to the order of about 9 wins in 70 games; the teams that have benefited the most are Kansas City and St. Louis, both by slightly less than 8 wins in 70 games. Interestingly, there appears to be something of a negative correlation between the two (R-squared of about .15). I'm really not sure why that might be, which makes me inclined to dismiss it until it can be replicated, or observed over a full season, but it's certainly a trend worth keeping an eye on.

Thursday
Offense is up a tick this year, and that's partly because this year's rookies are better hitters: Hey, Psst, Offense Might Be Creeping Up, by Dan Rozenson, Baseball Prospectus

Aha! So it appears that the rookie classes in 2013 and 2014 were particularly weak power hitters by recent standards, whereas the 2015 entrants swing heavy sticks. In fact, that .142 ISO and 2.4 percent rate of home runs are the second-highest marks in MLB history, behind only the 2006 rookies.

It's too soon to tell if the run-scoring environment in baseball has really changed. However, it does certainly seem that the wave of young, talented hitters emerging now has tilted the field back a hair toward the offense. It may be purely conspicuous timing that a few really good young power hitters came up together at just the right time to cause a bump in scoring that will even out after this wave crests. But the rookie class of pitchers this year has been weaker, so far; they've posted a 4.10 FIP vs. 3.89 last year.

For the first time in a fairly long while (and maybe ever), hitters are performing better in at-bats during which they swing at the first pitch, not just the ones where they make contact: Pitchers beware: Hitters are doing damage on your first pitch, by Chris Teeter, Beyond the Box Score

For the first time in the last ten years, hitters are performing better when swinging at the first pitch than they are generally. This statement actually holds all the way back to 1988, the first year for which pitch-based performance measures are available. 2015 is actually the only season in which the tOPS+ for this split exceeds or is 100. Given the nature of it being roughly half the sample of the other seasons I do not want to make too much of the absolute number (i.e., 101), nevertheless it is evidence in support of the 'attack the first-pitch' approach.

Friday
States measuring things like "plate discipline" and "chase %" and stuff like that may be useful, but not for determining how often a guy strikes out: Do plate discipline statistics correlate with strikeout and walk percentages?, by Shawn Brody, Beyond the Box Score

That is the R-squared of each of the six plate discipline stats compared to strikeout and walk rates, meaning the same thing as I have said previously—there is little to no relationship between the two. There’s a plethora of other reasons why there isn’t a strong relationship between the two. Some players are OK with striking out but want to make sure they don’t miss their pitch when they get it. Other players are free swingers, swinging at anything they like. It is likely because players take vastly different approaches at the plate—an openness or reluctance to swing at a certain pitch in a certain count—that attributes to the wide variety of hitters in today’s game.

Maybe the key to success, rather than having good players, is not having really bad players who bring you down: The importance of not having bad players, by Jeff Sullivan, Just a Bit Outside

And what's most interesting to me are the Astros. They might be the best example of the concept. By negative WAR, or really by avoiding negative WAR, the Astros rank No. 1 in baseball. By positive WAR, they're No. 15, right in the middle of the pack. Obviously, the good players are important, but the Astros have also gotten a lift from the bottom. They haven't had bad players bringing them down. They've been at least adequate all over the place, and when they've needed help, they've been able to dig in the system.

The Astros have had surface-level ability, and depth. There's Hank Conger, behind Jason Castro. There's been Carlos Correa, behind Marwin Gonzalez, behind Jed Lowrie. Preston Tucker has done an admirable job after being pressed into service. Domingo Santana has come up. Lance McCullers has been outstanding in the rotation. Vincent Velasquez seems to be at least adequate. And so on. The bullpen's deep. There are still players on the farm. By negative WAR, the Astros are separated from the Angels by two wins. From the A's by three wins. From the Rangers by somewhere in between.

And funny enough, when I looked at this same thing last October,examining the 2012-2014 window, the Astros came in dead last. Which means in a way, this happened quickly. The Astros had to put up with a lot of crap, but they've suddenly arrived, and they've arrived with depth to support a more-than-adequate front line. I wouldn't quite call them "complete," but they aren't far away.

Thank you for reading

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