As it has been well-publicized by the media, both in and outside of the Colorado area, Mike Hampton‘s time in the Mile High City was anything but successful. In his two years with the Rockies, Hampton posted a won-loss record of just 21-28, along with a major league-high ERA of 5.75-more than half a run higher than the next closest starter, fellow Rockie and member of the Great Changeup Experiment, Denny Neagle.
And yet, as 2003 regular season gets under way, whose name do we see listed in the Atlanta Braves starting rotation? None other than Michael William Hampton. Acquired over the off-season in one of the most complicated deals of all time not involving Herschel Walker, Hampton joins perhaps the most vulnerable Braves rotation in a decade-a unit that has already seen its star have a brush with mortality, and an off-season signee go down until July.
What can be expected of Hampton, though? Members of the media have spent more than their fair share of time waxing philosophical on the situation, with most coming to the conclusion that gambling on the 30-year-old lefty is a worthwhile risk. Granted, this might very well be the case, as Hampton was among the winningest pitchers in the National League before signing with Colorado in 2001. Fellow Rockies refugee Darryl Kile was able to make the transition from 5,200 feet above sea-level to Busch Stadium without missing a beat. If he could do it, why can’t Hampton?
But what does history tell us? Well, if one takes “history” to mean the host of statistically comparable pitchers who have appeared over the past 130 years, then Nate Silver’s PECOTA projection system is as far as you’re going to have to look. According to PECOTA, Hampton should be good for roughly 160 innings of slightly below-average baseball in 2003-an ERA of 4.93 with a strikeout-to-walk ratio of nearly one-to-one.
However, in many ways, PECOTA’s assessment of Hampton is incomplete. After all, for the past two seasons, Hampton has spent more than half his starts in the most eye-poppingly ludicrous hitting environment in the history of the world. And if you don’t think that has an adverse effect on your skill set, you’re probably going to want to contact Jeff Cirillo and have a nice, long chat.
Now, in order for us to fill in the gaps that PECOTA ignores, the first thing we’ll have to do is look at former Rockies pitchers who have managed to escape from the clutches of Mile High, and make a living throwing a baseball elsewhere. Is there a trend we can identify among pitchers leaving Colorado who go on to pitch for other teams? Does playing at altitude appear to have a carry-over effect on a pitcher’s ability to perform? Below is a list of the top 15 pitchers in Rockies history, ranked by their innings pitched with the organization.
Pitcher IP ERA PRAR/IP -------------------------------------- Pedro Astacio 827.1 5.43 0.151 John Thomson 610.2 5.01 0.160 Kevin Ritz 576.1 5.20 0.154 Jamey Wright 541.1 5.57 0.100 Armando Reynoso 503.0 4.65 0.203 Brian Bohanon 471.0 5.83 0.119 Curt Leskanic 470.0 4.92 0.219 Darryl Kile 420.2 5.84 0.112 Mike Hampton 381.2 5.75 0.045 Steve Reed 369.2 3.68 0.327 Roger Bailey 356.0 4.90 0.160 Marvin Freeman 337.0 4.91 0.175 Denny Neagle 335.0 5.32 0.128 Darren Holmes 328.0 4.42 0.244 Bruce Ruffin 321.0 3.84 0.324 ----- ----- AVERAGE 456.2 0.169
First, an explanation of the stats. Innings pitched (IP) and Earned Run Average (ERA) you know. Pitcher Runs Above Replacement per Inning Pitched (PRAR/IP) you’re probably not quite as familiar with. PRAR is a statistic developed by Clay Davenport that measures the number of context-neutral runs that a pitcher saves above replacement level. It’s both park- and defense-adjusted, with higher numbers meaning more runs saved per inning. Dividing that number by innings pitched simply turns it into a rate stat, like OBP.
Getting back to our topic, though, how have these pitchers done since leaving Colorado? Below is a breakdown of each pitcher’s performance, through 2002, after appearing with the Rockies.
-- Season After -- ----- Overall ----- Pitcher Team IP ERA PRAR/IP IP ERA PRAR/IP ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Pedro Astacio HOU 28.2 3.14 0.349 220.2 4.57 0.141 NYN 191.2 4.79 0.109 John Thomson NYN 54.1 4.31 0.072 54.1 4.31 0.072 Jamey Wright MIL 164.2 4.10 0.212 488.2 4.73 0.127 Armando Reynoso NYN 91.1 4.53 0.121 545.2 4.77 0.136 Curt Leskanic MIL 77.1 2.56 0.478 146.2 3.07 0.395 Darryl Kile STL 232.1 3.91 0.245 544.1 3.54 0.259 Steve Reed SF/CL 80.1 3.14 0.508 323.1 3.40 0.319 Darren Holmes NYA 51.1 3.33 0.292 174.0 4.03 0.218 ----- ----- ----- ----- AVERAGE 108.0 0.219 312.1 0.205
Granted, it’s not the most sophisticated way to evaluate performance, but for an exercise such as this, it’ll do. As you can see, the column on the left reflects the performance of former Rockies pitchers in their first year away from Coors-or in the case of Pedro Astacio, the first year-and-a-half. Predictably, runs allowed are down across-the-board, with every pitcher improving upon his Elevated ERA™ by at least half a run.
The pitchers’ context-neutral performances are more surprising. Both in the season immediately after leaving Colorado and overall, former Rockies make a noticeable improvement on their PRAR/IP scores-0.050 of a run in the “season after,” and 0.040 of a run overall. Translated to 200 innings over the life of a season, that’s 10 runs of improvement in the year after leaving Colorado, and eight runs of improvement, per season, going forward, that cannot be attributed to a park illusion.
In other words, pitchers who leave Colorado don’t just go to look better, thanks to more friendly home parks. They actually get better, with regard to their physical ability to perform.
Of course, we must tread lightly in determining the significance of this conclusion. While the sample of innings we’ve used is reasonable in size, the number of pitchers-eight-who’ve left Colorado and made appearances with other teams certainly obscures our findings. Nevertheless, it’s probably safe to say that there isn’t a negative effect on a pitcher’s performance after leaving Colorado, which is, in all honesty, good enough for me.
OK, so we can expect Hampton to perform a little better this season than he did last season with the Rockies, simply because he’s changing home addresses. Big deal. Hampton’s problem wasn’t really Coors Field last year, anyway. This will come as no surprise to those of you who pay close attention to the box scores, but Hampton not only sucked at home in 2002, he sucked on the road as well. Take a look:
2002 IP H R ER HR BB K ERA BAA ------------------------------------------------------- Home 69 79 48 44 7 35 36 5.68 .247 Away 109 149 87 78 17 56 38 6.44 .288
Yes, you’re seeing that correctly. Despite pitching close to 40% of his innings in the best hitting environment on the planet, and pitching in the NL West-the division which claims three of the best pitchers’ parks in all of baseball in Dodger Stadium, Qualcomm Stadium, and PacBell Park-Hampton was worse on the road last season in almost every possible way.
So what does this mean? If Hampton was worse on the road last season than he was at home, does that negate the positive effect we would normally expect to see from a pitcher escaping from Colorado? Maybe. Since 1987, 25 different pitchers have “accomplished” this same feat-that is, posting a higher ERA on the road than at home, while their home Park Factor was above 105. Roughly three-quarters of those pitchers performed worse in the following season. Take a look:
Season 1 Home Away Overall Pitcher Year Team IP ERA IP ERA PRAR/IP ------------------------------------------------------------------- Mike Moore 1987 SEA 109.1 4.12 121.2 5.25 0.108 Pete Smith 1988 ATL 125.0 3.46 70.1 4.09 0.200 Mike Bielecki 1989 CHN 114.1 2.83 98.0 3.49 0.235 Roger Clemens 1989 BOS 105.2 2.90 147.2 3.29 0.316 Frank Viola 1989 MIN 128.0 3.52 133.0 3.79 0.313 Mike Bielecki 1990 CHN 75.2 4.88 92.1 4.97 0.083 Mike Harkey 1990 CHN 85.1 2.43 88.1 4.08 0.276 Char. Leibrandt 1990 ATL 87.0 2.59 75.1 3.82 0.271 Roy Smith 1990 MIN 73.1 4.30 80.0 5.29 0.085 John Smoltz 1990 ATL 124.0 2.76 107.1 5.11 0.259 Kevin Tapani 1990 MIN 74.2 3.38 84.2 4.68 0.207 Frank Viola 1993 BOS 91.2 2.26 92.0 4.01 0.272 Erik Hanson 1996 TOR 96.2 5.31 118.0 5.49 0.093 Pat Hentgen 1996 TOR 152.1 3.19 113.1 3.26 0.330 Armando Reynoso 1996 COL 88.0 4.81 80.2 5.13 0.202 John Thomson 1997 COL 93.2 4.32 88.0 5.11 0.180 Glendon Rusch 1998 KCA 85.0 5.66 65.2 6.17 0.103 Steve Trachsel 1999 CHN 98.0 5.14 107.2 5.93 0.117 Chris Holt 2000 HOU 113.2 4.91 93.1 5.88 0.145 Steve Parris 2000 CIN 90.2 4.07 102.0 5.47 0.145 Brad Radke 2000 MIN 123.1 3.94 102.1 5.05 0.260 Mark Redman 2000 MIN 76.0 4.14 75.1 5.38 0.264 Masato Yoshii 2000 COL 67.2 5.85 99.2 5.87 0.131 Tony Armas Jr. 2001 MON 79.1 3.97 85.0 4.87 0.224 Chad Durbin 2001 KCA 109.2 4.27 69.1 5.97 0.123 ----- ----- ----- AVERAGE 98.2 95.1 0.202
Pretty, isn’t it? And here’s the following season for each pitcher, to complete the comparison. You’re going to want to keep your eye on the two columns on the far right, as they display how much better or worse each pitcher was in Season 2 than in Season 1.
Season 2 Pitcher Year IP ERA PRAR/IP +/- ------------------------------------------------------ Mike Moore 1988 228.1 3.78 0.245 +0.137 Pete Smith 1989 142.0 4.75 0.063 -0.137 Mike Bielecki 1990 168.0 4.93 0.083 -0.152 Roger Clemens 1990 228.1 1.93 0.487 +0.171 Frank Viola 1990 249.2 2.67 0.348 +0.035 Mike Bielecki 1991 173.2 4.46 0.006 -0.077 Mike Harkey 1991 18.2 5.30 0.054 -0.222 Char. Leibrandt 1991 229.2 3.49 0.174 -0.097 Roy Smith 1991 80.1 5.60 0.037 -0.048 John Smoltz 1991 229.2 3.80 0.196 -0.063 Kevin Tapani 1991 244.0 2.99 0.295 +0.088 Frank Viola 1994 31.0 4.65 0.194 -0.078 Erik Hanson 1997 15.0 7.80 -0.133 -0.226 Pat Hentgen 1997 264.0 3.68 0.258 -0.072 Armando Reynoso 1997 91.1 4.53 0.120 -0.082 John Thomson 1998 161.0 4.81 0.217 +0.037 Glendon Rusch 1999 5.0 12.60 0.000 -0.103 Steve Trachsel 1997 201.1 4.51 0.139 +0.022 Chris Holt 2001 151.1 5.77 0.053 -0.092 Steve Parris 2001 105.2 4.60 0.151 +0.006 Brad Radke 2001 226.2 3.94 0.235 -0.025 Mark Redman 2001 58.0 4.50 0.172 -0.092 Masato Yoshii 2001 113.0 4.78 0.150 +0.019 Tony Armas Jr. 2002 164.1 4.44 0.176 -0.048 Chad Durbin 2002 8.1 11.88 -0.480 -0.603 ----- ----- AVERAGE 143.1 0.198
While there are certainly some notable performance swings from Season 1 to Season 2, overall the variance doesn’t appear to be large enough to render a definitive conclusion. While the majority of pitchers saw a decline after posting a worse ERA on the road than they did at home, the overall difference is simply not large enough to allow us to say that Hampton is likely to do the same. Sure, -0.004 PRAR/IP shows up on the screen, but translated to 200 IP, that’s less than a one-run difference from the average pitcher’s performance in Season 1. Yes, that’s right-one run.
So what does all of this mean? Well, essentially it means that based strictly on historical precedent, the Braves can expect Hampton to be the same pitcher in 2003 as he was in 2002, if not a little better. According to the data we’ve presented, there is some evidence to suggest that pitchers show improvement after leaving Colorado, for no other reason than the fact that they’ve left Colorado. We’ve also shown that pitching worse on the road when you should have technically been worse at home is not a precursor to a decline, and is more likely just a statistical fluke.
Of course, that conclusion also ignores a number of facts specific to Hampton’s profile, two of which are actually addressed in PECOTA’s projection:
- Even before joining the Rockies, Mike Hampton issued a lot of free passes. People tend to forget this because he spent the first seven years of his career in two of the best pitchers’ parks in all of baseball-the Astrodome and Shea Stadium-but Mike Hampton wasn’t really all that good to begin with. In his two seasons prior to joining the Rockies, Hampton struck out a total 328 batters, while walking 201. Does that scream $121 million to you? Yeah, I didn’t think so.
- He keeps the ball on the ground. Outside of Tim Hudson, there really isn’t a starter in the majors who induces more ground balls than Hampton does. Even with an ERA over six last season, Hampton allowed just 24 home runs in 178.2 innings pitched. Granted, that might not seem like anything special to the naked eye, but that’s quite impressive given the total number of runs he allowed (138).
- He’s joining a staff headed by perhaps the greatest pitching coach ever. He might not be able to heal lepers or return sight to the blind, but Leo Mazzone can raise pitchers from the dead with the best of ’em. If there’s one person who could turn Hampton’s career around at this point, it’s Mazzone.
Now, does this mean that the Braves made a wise decision in gambling on Hampton? Given that they’re paying only a portion of his contract, and that they have a legitimate miracle worker in the bullpen, probably. But then again, just because you’ve made a good bet, that doesn’t necessarily mean that you’re likely to succeed. If you don’t believe me, just ask Dan O’Dowd.
Thank you for reading
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