The Setup
Last year, Chase Utley stole 23 bases. That is a good number. In fact, it was a career high for the Philadelphia Phillies‘ All-Star second baseman. Even more remarkable was that Utley was not caught stealing once all season. A perfect season on the basepaths is a rare accomplishment, but it practically begs the question: “Why didn’t Utley try to steal more bases?”
The Proof
The explanation consists of two interlocking parts: First, Utley caught some breaks, and second, he was demonstrating one of the basic truths of corporate economics.
Why would I try to take away from Utley’s tremendous success by claiming he was lucky on the basepaths? And how, exactly, is luck involved with a feat that is so obviously related to pure physical skills like speed and instinct?
First, let’s consult history. Since caught stealing statistics were first consistently recorded in the National League in 1951, there have been three major leaguers who have stolen at least 20 bases in a season without being caught once. Kevin McReynolds did it in 1988 with the New York Mets, and Paul Molitor matched the feat in 1994 with the Toronto Blue Jays.
Molitor was a consistently successful base stealer, and followed his 20-for-20 performance by going 12-for-12 in 1995. McReynolds, on the other hand, followed his 21-for-21 season with a pedestrian 15-for-22 one. If this limited history is a guide, Utley has, at best, an even-odds chance of another perfect season on the base paths in 2010.
Even that rough calculation overstates the case. Rather, it is much more likely that Utley’s true base stealing talent is closer to his career success rate of 88 percent, which is, of course, still excellent. Maintaining perfection is terribly difficult, and it’s more likely than not that some catcher will throw Utley out this year. The sheer rarity of the feat makes it nearly unrealizable twice in a row.
But let’s assume Utley can expect to be successful between 85-90 percent of the time. Shouldn’t he still steal more bases? While fans and fantasy players might appreciate the extra attempts, it’s not clear doing so would help the Phillies win more games.
Imagine the easiest base-stealing opportunity Utley faces all season. He’s got a right-hander on the mound. The pitcher has a slow, deliberate move toward first base. The catcher has a noodle arm. The dirt is packed just right to give Utley the best possible grip in his cleats. Under these circumstances, Utley is very likely to be successful, so he should absolutely steal. Now imagine the second-easiest situation, and the third. He should still attempt to steal, right? The question we want to answer is how unfavorable the circumstances have to get before Utley should stay put.
Introductory economics textbooks usually contain a case study that helps students differentiate between thinking in terms of average costs and benefits and thinking in terms of marginal costs and benefits. Using marginal thinking, the textbook invariably explains, is what helped, for example, Continental Airlines increase its profits during the 1960s. Utley, as well as his wise and experienced first base coach, Davey Lopes, is more like Continental than you might think.
The theory Continental applied was one of the first maxims of profit maximization. They realized that if they had empty seats on their planes, it would cost them very little to fill: essentially just the cost of the extra gas to accommodate the extra weight. As long as the marginal revenue they earned from selling another ticket exceeded the extra costs of carrying another passenger, they should sell more tickets. In economic jargon, firms should supply their product until the costs of making one more unit exceed the amount they can sell it for, the revenue they earn.
The Conclusion
By analogy, Utley should attempt to steal bases until the extra chance of winning is outweighed by the decreased chance of winning in the event he is caught. If Utley attempted to steal in any situation with a less favorable chance of success, he would be hurting his team because the marginal costs would outweigh the marginal benefits.
That exact break-even point is going to depend on variables that change from game to game and inning to inning. But let’s assume that Utley, a smart base runner with a great first base coach, has found that point. Because each situation easier than the point at which Utley should stay put was by definition easier, Utley’s average success rate would be quite high, much higher than the 70 percent success rate needed to break even. If he were to keep attempting stolen bases until his average season total matched the 70 percent point, he’d have been stealing in situations where he was hurting his team’s chances of winning.
If the Phillies, Lopes, and manager Charlie Manuel consider analysis at the margins, Utley might not run more at all next season. And there is ample evidence that the Phillies do understand this analysis. Last year, the Phillies had four players steal at least 20 bases, and none of them was less than 75 percent successful. During Lopes’ first season in Philadelphia in 2007, the team set the record for stolen base percentage at 87.9. In each of the subsequent years, the Phillies have led the league in the category. With Utley and Lopes, the perfect is not necessarily the enemy of the good.
A version of this story originally appeared on ESPN Insider .
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Also to be factored in is the wear-and-tear of base stealing. If you only go a couple of times a week (factoring in foul balls, balls hit in play, ball four), how much that amounts to, I don't know. But I'm sure it pushes the real break-even point up some.
In 138 times standing on base (H-2B-3B-HR+BB+HBP) while an RHP was on the mound in 2009, Chase Utley had 12 SB, or 8.70% of the time.
Eerie how even those two percentages are.
Given that Howard was at bat close to 100% of the time that Utley was standing on first at some point during the inning and that Utley was standing on first in roughly 30% of Howard's AB vs RHPs, (I wouldn't know where to find the data saying exactly who was hitting when Utley actually succeeded in stealing) I would postulate ($5 word?) that Utley's success rate at SB goes up when Howard is at bat vs RHPs. Especially because neither Jayson Werth nor Raul Ibanez hit RHP as well as they do LHP (despite their HR splits, which is weird), and certainly neither hit RHP as well as Howard.
If true, then the "cost" of being caught in that situation would likely be offset or marginalized by the increased likelihood that Utley will be successful stealing.
As long as that is the case, we can still identify a threshold beyond which it would be inadvisable to steal. Individual actors may be mistaken in identifying where the threshold is located, and in cases near the threshold a mixed strategy will still be optimal, but the other team can only do so much to deter base running and in most cases their attempts to do so are patent (pitcher repeatedly throwing over, predominantly fastball pitch selection, etc.).
But if you buy that setup, the runner's mixed strategy is based only on the payoffs of the defensive team, not his own team's marginal benefit. And more importantly, the resulting interactions that we get to witness may produce any pattern including Utley's 23-0 performance (however unlikely). If you buy this though, it's crucial to note that Utley played the stealing game more than 23 times. Sometimes by strategic chance he didn't attempt to steal.
I have to assume that someone (perhaps in the Journal of Sports Economics?) has produced a more thorough treatment of this game. What I really object to is the idea that a 100% success rate demonstrates that Utley and the Phillies left something on the table or that a 70% rate demonstrates a well-optimized team because it simply doesn't.
I'm not sure if I was unclear or if you misread the article, but exactly the opposite of the claim you ascribe to me is the thesis of this article.
Utley steals at 88 percent. How many more situations would he have to steal in to lower his rate to 70 percent? The author of the article does not know, and makes no attempt to determine the answer to this question.
If Utley attempted 40 steals a season instead of 23, what would his (typical) success rate be? 88%? 85%? 80%? 70%? His next marginal steal attempt would result in a success rate near his 88% maximum. If he kept stealing until his MOST UNFAVORABLE situation still yielded a 70% success rate, he would still (in general) be helping the Phillies' offense on every steal attempt, and his overall success rate would be somewhere between 70 and 88 percent. How many more times could he attempt to steal before he started hurting the Phillies? I don't know, but I'm pretty sure the answer is not "zero".
Utley could certainly try to steal more bases, and would be very likely to help the Phillies by doing so.
Unnecessary and pointless criticism. He never even insinuated that the answer to "how many more times..." was "zero". Re-Read the Conclusions paragraph and beg/raise/provoke/prompt/stimulate for forgiveness.
BUT IT DOES NOT BEG THE QUESTION.
Utley stolen bases by month:
Apr: 2
May: 3
Jun: 2
Jul: 5
Aug: 4
Sep/Oct: 7
Utley was also 3-3 in stolen bases during the postseason.
I love this line. It calls to mind a mental picture of Utley sitting in the on-deck circle with a calculator figuring the effect of SB or CS on the Phillies' chance of winning. Good writing.
It is easy to forget that for the overwhelming majority of players, Utley included, the decision whether or not to steal in any particular situation is largely tactical, informed at a top level by strategy and long-term personal success rate, but dominated by the question of whether it will be beneficial THIS TIME. Factors like the contact rate of following hitters, who's on the mound and behind the plate (does anyone think that Utley's performance would have been 23/23 if he'd played more games with Yadier Molina's cannon behind the plate?), etc., must dominate the abstract analytical approach in practice. If Utley and Lopeshad guessed wrong even once, we wouldn't even be having this article and conversation -- but Utley would still be an excellent base stealer.